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Institutional philanthropy (which includes the spectrum of all formalized 
grantmaking organizations) remains one of the least understood and researched aspects of 
giving.  There is also limited scholarly attention to the relationship between foundation 
governance and grantmaking, despite normative claims about ‗elite‘ foundation boards 
selecting ‗elite‘ nonprofit‘s. Yet, foundations are increasingly using committees of 
community volunteers to allocate grants, rather than leaving grant decisions to a 
traditional board of directors. The goal of community involvement in grantmaking is 
better grant decisions, due to community members‘ information advantage and 
consequently greater knowledge of community needs. However, no one has tested 
whether community boards are making different decisions than traditional boards, much 
less whether their decisions are better. Drawing on a sample of 6 funders who use both 
community and traditional boards, their 616 grantees, and 955 comparable non-grantees I 
build on the economic model of giving to identify differences and similarities in the 
characteristics of nonprofit‘s that receive grants. Although I find much more congruence 
between grant decisions of community and traditional boards than literature expects I 
explore this finding through an in depth case study of two foundations who do this type 
of work. I find, similar to previous work in the public sector that simply involving 
community members in a grants process does not automatically generate different 
organizational decisions. Instead, it is only when a public participation program is 










 A 2010 report published by Grantmakers for Effective Organizations finds that 
48% of grantmakers surveyed sought input on grant proposals from grantee or 
community representatives, 36% sought advice from grantee advisory committees, and 
14% delegated funding decisions to grantee or community representatives (Bourns). 
Involving community members in the grant making process is a newly emerging 
phenomenon as citizen input is typically not solicited or used in the grant making process 
(Burbridge et al. 2002; Lindeman 1988; Ostrander 1999; Ostrower and Stone 2006). 
Despite normative claims about elite foundation board members making grant decisions, 
foundations are increasingly using committees of community volunteers to allocate 
grants,  rather than leaving grant decisions to a traditional board of directors (Bourns 
2010; Enright 2010; Gibson, Levin, and Dietz 2010).   
 Mainstream media has expressed interest in this phenomenon, with articles 
appearing in The New York Times and Forbes Magazine. Additionally, corporations like 
American Express, The Home Depot and PepsiCo currently utilize members of the public 
to vote online and select grantees. A quick internet search of community involvement in 
philanthropy reveals a number of new buzzwords such as crowdsourcing philanthropy, 
stakeholder involvement in philanthropy and participatory philanthropy.  
  The increased attention to participatory philanthropy is largely due to the secrecy 
surrounding the recruitment and selection of philanthropic board members. Traditionally 
the recruitment of board members is described by scholars as a closed recruitment 
process (Gersick and Stone 2004).  This closed recruitment process often results in 
foundation boards that are composed of family members and/or personal/professional 
associates of existing board members (Indiana 2009; Gersick and Stone 2004). This 
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closed recruitment process has led to many criticisms of foundation boards, as the insular 
boards are not demographically representative of the public (Burbridge et al. 2002; 
Lindeman 1988; González-Rivera 2009). 
 However, most research on the relationship between who serves on a foundation 
board and resulting grantmaking decisions is replete with normative assumptions
1
 and 
only focuses on the relationship between the demographic composition of philanthropic 
boards and grant decisions (Burbridge et al. 2002; Lindeman 1988; Ostrander 1999; 
Ostrower and Stone 2006).  Although scholars of philanthropy assume that the 
composition of foundation boards impacts grantmaking decisions, this is not supported by 
empirical analysis.  
 Despite the lack of empirical support for these assumptions advocates of 
stakeholder involvement
2
 in philanthropy argue that grantmaking decisions will not only 
be different but will somehow be ‗better‘ if community members are involved (Bourns 
2010; Enright 2010; Gibson, Levin, and Dietz 2010; Ostrander 1999). Community 
involvement is thought to improve grantmaking decisions, because community members 
have an information advantage, with more knowledge of community needs and an 
understanding of which nonprofit‘s are ‗better‘ suited to address these needs (Bourns 
2010; Enright 2010; Ostrander 1999).  




 See Kaper, Ramos and Walker (2004) and Gonzales-Riveria (2009) for recent literature on assumptions 
about the connection on the demographics of foundation board members and grantmaking decisions. 
Kasper, Ramos and Walker (2004) find that minority led nonprofit organizations (i.e. those organizations 
that have a racial/ethnic minority serving as its chief executive) annually receive fewer than 10 percent of 
all foundation grants. Furthermore, a 2009 report supports these findings as researchers discovered that the 
ten foundations that have the most minority foundation board members made approximately 47% of the 
grants to minority led nonprofit organizations (Gonzales-Riveria, 2009).  These demographic surveys of 
foundation boards are typically used by scholars to demonstrate that the lack of board diversity results in 
grantmaking decisions not reflective of community or nonprofit need (Burbridge et al. 2002; Lindeman 
1988; Ostrander 1999; Ostrower and Stone 2006).  Yet, the collection of demographic surveys is not 
empirical evidence that there is some connection between board composition and grantmaking decisions. 
2
 I use the terms stakeholder involvement, community involvement and public participation synonymously 
throughout this research and focus on the involvement of citizens in organizational decisions. Thomas 




When you bring in excluded groups, fundamental changes occur. That is because 
those who have been ‗outside‘ bring different perceptions, different frameworks, 
different questions to the table. And if people in the institution engage with those 
ideas, they will see problems from new perspectives, get new information, read 
into more networks have greater legitimacy in the broad range of people in 
society, and be stronger and more effective (Berresford, as cited in Enright and 
Bourns, 2010, 45). 
 
Research across public and nonprofit sectors supports this assumption and finds that 
when those who are not traditionally involved in organizational decisions are included 
there are often positive impacts on organizational outputs and/or outcomes (Meier, 
Wrinkle, and Polinard 1999; Selden 1998; Hindera 1993; Dolan and Rosenbloom 2003; 
Thielemann and Stewart Jr 1996; Brown 2002; Zald 1969, 1967; Siciliano 1996;  Hyde 
2003; Hyde and Hopkins 2004).   
 However, in foundation literature no research has examined the potential 
connection between board composition and organizational decisions. Philanthropic 
scholars are consequently unable to scientifically conclude that who serves on a 
foundation board matters. A few studies examine how different types of foundations 
(corporate, government, community, independent or family) make grant decisions and 
note the (often small or nonexistent) differences in grantee selection (Ashley and Faulk 
2010; McGinnis and Ashley 2011). Yet, these studies do not take into account differences 
in board composition or specifics about how these foundation boards are governed. 
Overall, understanding the relationship between foundation board structure and 
composition and grantmaking decisions has largely gone unexplored in research literature 
(Bourns 2010; Enright 2010; Gibson, Levin, and Dietz 2010; Ostrander 1999).  
 In this dissertation I ask, if the structure and composition of a foundation board is 
completely changed (from a more traditional, elite foundation board to one of a board 
composed of community members) do we discover that grant decisions have changed as 
well? This dissertation fills a gap in existing literature by using a unique grants database 
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to determine whether or not community and traditional boards make different grant 
decisions. I also contribute to existing literature by incorporating theoretical insights into 
understanding why grant decisions between community and traditional boards may be 
different and not just focusing on differences in grant decisions that might occur with 
community involvement. 
 For the purposes of this research, I define community and traditional boards based 
on the recruitment process of new board members. Community boards are grantmaking 
boards purposefully composed of citizens from the general public. Community members 
serve as volunteers, often as a result of a volunteer application or open nomination 
process.  The recruitment process of traditional board members is the antithesis of this 
open, inclusive process. Instead, the recruitment process of traditional boards is largely 
closed and new board members are recruited to serve based on personal and professional 
networks of existing board members. Each foundation in this research has both a 
community and traditional board making grant decisions for separate programs. 
 In the first component of this dissertation I use t tests of differences of means and 
regression analysis to determine whether community and traditional boards reward 
different organizational and financial characteristics of nonprofit applicants. In the 
second phase of this research I focus on the design of a community involvement program 
as public participation scholars find that simply seeking citizen input does not 
automatically yield a change or difference in organizational decisions (Franklin and 
Ebdon 2005; Ebdon and Franklin 2006; Thomas 2012). Instead, public participation 
scholars find that the process or how community members are involved in a program 
impacts organizational decisions (Ebdon and Franklin 2006;  Franklin and Ebdon 2005; 
Thomas 2012). Therefore, I conduct case studies within two funders and develop a more 
nuanced understanding of how the design of a community involvement may impact 
grantmaking decisions. I then use the qualitative findings to build and analyze a second 
set of regression models in the third component of this research.  This second set of 
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regression analyses allows me to quantitatively determine how the design of a 
grantmakers community involvement programs may impact grantmaking decisions.   
Research Questions 
 I explore three overarching research questions within this dissertation through an 
explanatory mixed methods approach.  In an explanatory mixed methods approach 
qualitative data is used to explain or build upon quantitative results (Creswell and Clark 
2007). 
  The first research question is: Are the organizational and financial characteristics 
of nonprofit‘s awarded grants by community boards different from the organizational and 
financial characteristics of nonprofit‘s awarded grants by traditional boards? I examine 
this question by quantitatively comparing grants made within six foundations that use 
community boards to award grants in one program and traditional boards to award grants 
in a separate program.   
 In the second phase of this research I conduct case study research on two funders 
and ask the following questions:  
1) Rather than focus on the organizational and financial characteristics of the 
nonprofit organization I examine the narrative descriptions of projects
3
 funded by 
community and traditional boards through each funders grant descriptions 
(summaries of projects funded). Are there differences in community and 
traditional boards grant decisions that are not observed at the organizational level 
included in regression analysis? 




 In both the grant descriptions and qualitative interviews I am not able to discern whether foundations have 
a preference for funding general operating support as opposed to project support. However, a Center for 
Effective Philanthropy (2010) report found that although general operating support is highly desired by 
nonprofit‘s it is not a priority for most funders. 
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2) How does the absence or presence of particular components of an effectively 
designed public participation program (as identified by public participation 
scholars) impact the difference or similarity in grant decisions made by 
community and traditional boards? 
In order to determine how foundations are designing their community board programs I 
conduct case studies with two foundations.  I interview a staff member working with the 
traditional board member, a staff member working with the community board, and a 
community board member. 
 Third, the qualitative framework I develop and case studies I conduct guide the 
construction of my regression models and subsequent analysis. I quantitatively determine 
how the design elements of a community participation program may impact grantee 
selection.  Therefore, in the third phase of my research I ask: Are the organizational and 
financial characteristics of nonprofit‘s awarded grants by community and traditional 
boards similar when the design of a grantmakers public participation programs are taken 
into account? 
 Finally, after a comprehensive review of public participation literature the case 
study component of this dissertation allows me to determine if the design elements 
identified in public sector research can be utilized in nonprofit research. In this research I 
generate a framework of an effectively designed public participation program in a 
grantmaking organization. This framework contributes to existing literature as public 
participation frameworks are highly contextual and there have been no attempts to define 
the design elements that compromise a nonprofit community involvement program. A 
great deal of nonprofit research has been devoted to understanding whether and how 
community members should be involved in organizational decisions. Therefore, 
understanding how community involvement programs can best be designed may enhance 
future nonprofit research and have implications for practice.  
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Impetus for Research 
Theoretical 
 The claim that grantmaking by stakeholders yields different decisions assumes 
that scholars currently understand how foundation boards actually make grant decisions 
and which nonprofit characteristics they reward.  We may hypothesize that ―differently 
motivated donors may use different criteria in donation decisions, leading to different 
choices of recipients‖ but this concept hasn‘t been tested to date (Ashley and Faulk 2010, 
46). Furthermore,  although an extensive literature exists on the organizational and 
financial characteristics of nonprofit‘s that impact individual donations or the 
contributions variable on the 990 form (an aggregated measure of gifts, grants and 
donations), isolating how these determinants impact grant selection has received limited 
scholarly attention (Ashley and Faulk 2010; McGinnis and Ashley 2011). 
 In this dissertation I incorporate theoretical insights to this debate by using 
information asymmetry as an overarching theory to frame why community and traditional 
boards make different grant decisions. I then incorporate elite and network theory as well 
as empirical findings from the economic model of giving to generate and test specific 
hypotheses about the organizational and financial characteristics of nonprofit‘s that 
community boards reward. The economic model of giving was first examined by 
Weisbrod and Dominguez (1986). In their 1986 article, they, ―test the hypothesis that 
voluntary giving is responsive to conventional market variables such as advertising 
expenditures, price, and quality‖ (83). 
 In this way theory drives the development of my quantitative models and I 






 Like individuals, foundations must rely on signals from nonprofit‘s, as 
information asymmetry exists between foundation board members as donors and the 
eventual recipients of services
4
 (Hansmaan 1980, 1987; Easley and O‘Hara 1986; 
Krashinsky 1986, 1997). Due to contract failure, foundation board members are limited 
in their ability to monitor a nonprofit‘s performance, particularly at the time a grant is 
awarded. The performance and/or quality of a nonprofit are essentially unobservable 
characteristics.  Instead, donors instead rely on a number of easily observable 
characteristics of nonprofit‘s (organizational and financial characteristics) as proxies for 
the unobservable quality and performance of nonprofit (Weisbrod and Dominguez 1986; 
Parsons 2006). However, empirical findings concerning how individual donors or 
contributors react to various organizational and financial characteristics cannot be 
appropriated to understand foundation grant decisions. 
 In foundations the presence or absence of information asymmetry is complicated. 
Philanthropic boards have access to much more information (such as applications, tax 
forms, audits, strategic plans, etc.) than individual donors. Additionally, each board 
member may have differing degrees of incomplete information based on their existing or 
prior knowledge of nonprofit‘s applying for grants. 
  As a framework for this paper I posit that the degree of information asymmetry 
between community and traditional boards will differ, with community boards having an 
information advantage and relying less on organizational and financial proxies of a 




 To obtain information on an organization donors could historically turn to the following three sources: 1) 
a hardcopy of the organization‘s annual report or IRS 990 form; 2) word-of-mouth, including direct contact 
with the nonprofit organization‘s clients, and 3) the organization‘s fundraising campaigns (Saxton, Neely 




nonprofit‘s performance or quality. Literature indicates that one of the advantages of 
involving community members in philanthropy is that community members have either 
access to information or more knowledge about nonprofit‘s than traditional boards since 
they are embedded in their communities (Bourns 2010; Kissane 2004, 2007, 2010; 
Ostrander 1999). Research also finds that community members have different perceptions 
of community needs, solutions to community needs and differing views on the 
performance of public and nonprofit sector organizations (Kissane 2004, 2007, 2010; 
Melkers and Thomas 1998; Guo and Musso 2007; Wellens and Jegers 2011; Bolduc 
1980). Furthermore, if community members didn‘t have existing knowledge of a 
nonprofit, finding out this information would have extremely low transaction costs 
(Tinkelman 1999).   
Public Participation Literature 
 In addition to information asymmetry I also utilize public participation literature 
to explore the connection between foundation board composition and grantmaking 
decisions. Rather than solely focusing on how the absence or presence of community 
involvement may impact organizational decisions, this research also finds that process (or 
the design of community involvement programs) matters. The design of a community 
involvement program is found to mediate the relationship between public involvement 
and organizational outcomes (Franklin and Ebdon 2005; Thomas 2012). After a synthesis 
of the literature, I examine the components (hereafter referred to as design elements) of a 
public participation program thought to impact organizational decisions through in depth 
case studies of two foundations in my study.  
 By extrapolating a public sector framework to enhance our knowledge of a 
nonprofit phenomenon I also advance nonprofit theory and determine whether findings 
generated in public sector research can be used by nonprofit scholars. I also advance 
public management literature through a comprehensive synthesis of public participation 
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literature. Furthermore, the framework I develop of an effectively designed public 
participation program is specifically applicable to grantmaking organizations, for which 
no research has been conducted to date.  
Methodological 
 Institutional philanthropy (which includes the spectrum of all formalized 
grantmaking organizations) remains one of the least understood and researched aspects of 
philanthropy, with very little empirical
5
 research conducted on this subject. Most studies 
examining foundation board composition are descriptive statistics of foundation giving or 
survey statistics on board composition, rather than quantitative research that examines 
many of the normative claims posited in the literature about the potential connections 
between philanthropic governance and grantmaking.   
Some of the nonprofit characteristics thought to impact receipt of grants are the 
nonprofit‘s geographic location, fiscal status, performance/reputation, mission and the 
degree of existing personal connection to the funder (Ashley and Faulk 2010; Gersick 
and Stone 2004; Grønbjerg, Martell, and Paarlberg 2000). Yet, the relationship between 
the organizational and financial characteristics of nonprofit‘s and grant success has not 
been empirically examined, despite the focus and claims in existing literature that 
foundation board composition impacts grantmaking (Burbridge et al. 2002; González-
Rivera 2009).  Without quantitative analysis to examine whether or not there is some 
connection between a philanthropic board and the nonprofit characteristics it rewards, we 
cannot be certain that the structure and composition of philanthropic governance matters.  




 There is a large body of qualitative and case study work conducted on foundations. Typically this work is 
descriptive and not quantitatively driven (Arnove 1980; Bombardieri and Robinson 2005; Nielson 1972; 
Odendahl 1989; Jenkins 1998; Karl and Katz  1987; Gronbjerg et. al., 2000; Gersick and Stone 2004; 
Anheir and Daly 2007; Ostrander 1999; Frumkin 2006; Moody 2007; Odendahl 1990; ).   
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 Through quantitative analysis and the creation of a unique grants database I 
contribute to nonprofit research on grantmaking and the determinants of nonprofit 
resource acquisition by building on the economic model of giving. Additionally, by 
incorporating a mixed methods approach in this research I do not solely focus on board 
characteristics but determine how other factors (namely process variables or how 
community members are utilized in a public participation program) may impact selection 
of nonprofit grantees.  
In the literature review below I first present the gaps in both scholarly and 
normative literature surrounding the potential relationship between philanthropic 
governance and grantmaking.  I discuss the following: demographic research on board 
composition of philanthropic organizations, an overview of research exploring the 
relationship between board composition and grantmaking, and information on the 
organizational and financial characteristics of nonprofit‘s that predict donations.   
I also conduct a comprehensive literature review on the design elements of a 
public participation program that are thought to impact organizational decisions and 
generate a framework of an effectively designed public participation program. This 
framework identifies and defines variables identified in public participation literature 
specific to grantmaking organizations. I then utilize this framework in case studies within 
two foundations to determine whether the design elements identified in public 
participation literature are absent or present in the average grantmaker. Finally, the 
qualitative analysis allows me to build and further refine a second set of regression 
models. This final set of regression models  combines the qualitative and quantitative 
data providing a more complete understanding of the relationship between community 







Demographic Composition and Grantmaking  
 Scholars posit that stakeholders should be involved in grantmaking because 
philanthropic boards are not demographically diverse (González-Rivera 2009; Ostrander 
1999). Although much of the literature on foundations focuses on the demographics of 
board members this is not the only aspect of board composition that may be impacting 
grant decisions.  However, a brief review of this literature is necessary in order to better 
understand some of the assumptions of descriptive democracy
6
 that underlie the 
arguments for increasing community involvement in grantmaking. 
 Studies of the demographics of foundation board members have been conducted 
for some time  (Lindeman 1988).  In Lindeman‘s (1988) research he collected 
quantitative data on 100 foundations and community trusts from 1921 to 1930 and found  
a typical trustee of an American foundation is a man well past middle age; he is 
more often than not a man of considerable affluence or one whose economic 
security ranks high; his social position in the community is that of a person who 
belongs to the higher income-receiving class of the population (72). 
 
 Even though Lindeman (1988) was conducting this research on foundations from 
the early 1900‘s current studies on the demographic composition of philanthropic boards 
have similar findings.  In 2002, a national study of 600 grantmakers found that ―white 




 Descriptive democracy is one model of democracy which ―focuses on the match (or mismatch‖ between 
the social groups in the community and the social characteristics of decision makers. If these are 
significantly out of balance, then elites are unrepresentative, that is, undemocratic. Measures to ensure 
demographic representation on philanthropic boards and to incorporate excluded groups into decision 
making are central to this perspective‖ (Jenkins 1998, p. 207). 
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men represent 56 to 72 percent of board members. . .white women represent 17 to 33 
percent of all board members‖ (Burbridge et al. 2002). This same study finds that only 10 
percent of foundation board members are people of color, and 33 percent are women 
(Burbridge et al. 2002).  Similar statistics are also found in a 2006 study by Ostrower and 
Stone who indicate that although women make up about 43% of nonprofit board 
members, they constitute only 34% of foundation board members.  Finally, a 2009 study 
of the 46 largest foundations in the country finds that 28% have no board members of 
color (González-Rivera 2009).  In 2009 researchers also found that the ten foundations 
with the most minority foundation board members made approximately 47% of the grants 
to minority led nonprofit organizations, which lends some support to existing 
assumptions that there is some connection between the governance of a philanthropic 
organization and its grantmaking decisions (González-Rivera 2009).   
Board Composition and Grantmaking 
Unfortunately, most of these studies stop at the collection of data on the 
racial/ethnic and gender diversity of boards. There is additional research examining the 
relationship between philanthropic governance and grantmaking but it presumptively 
draws connections between the demographic composition of philanthropic boards and 
grant decisions. Foundation boards are characterized as the elites in society who make 
grant decisions that are consequently not reflective of community or nonprofit need, and 
instead reflective of their own elite interests. 
―Private contributions by the elite support institutions that sustain their culture, 
their education, their policy formulation, their status - in short their interests‖ (Odendahl 
1990, 232). Karl and Katz (1987) state that when philanthropic boards decide to fund 
certain nonprofit organizations over others they ―have channeled their energies and 
research activities in directions they deemed important‖ (2). The theme emerging from 
these criticisms is that in choosing which nonprofit‘s receive funding board members 
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privileged backgrounds impact their grant decisions. However, the conclusions drawn in 
this literature should be interpreted with caution as they are not scientifically based.  
Outside of this demographic work and critiques of foundation giving, there is a 
small body of conceptual literature on philanthropic governance though not much 
empirical work (Frumkin 2006; Gersick and Stone 2004; Grønbjerg, Martell, and 
Paarlberg 2000; Odendahl 1990; Burbridge et al. 2002; Ostrander 1999). This is largely 
because it is difficult to collect qualitative or quantitative data on the governance of 
foundations, since there are no legal requirements for reporting this information (Institute 
2008). Thus, most grantmakers don‘t publish this information. This is concerning since 
recent statistics collected by The Foundation Center (2007) indicate that 90% of 
foundations have no staff at all and 20% of the largest national foundations have little or 
no staff. Therefore, the majority of grant decisions are made by board members.  
When we think about the rigorous empirical research in related for profit and 
nonprofit sector literature, which indicates that there are potential connections between  
board composition and organizational outcomes, the lack of research examining the 
connections between foundation board composition and grantmaking decisions becomes 
even more noteworthy (Brown 2005, 2002; Kochan et al. 2003; Jackson, Joshi, and 
Erhardt 2003; Zald 1969, 1967; Bradshaw, Murray, and Wolpin 1996; Siciliano 1996).  
Community Involvement in Philanthropy 
In contrast to criticisms of traditional foundation boards grantmaking activities, 
community involvement in grantmaking is thought to serve as a panacea for all of the 
‗problems‘ in traditional grantmaking (Enright and Bourns 2010; Ostrander 1999). 
Enright and Bourns (2010) conduct an interview with a grantmaker who states ―having 
people from the community involved helps the foundation because it leads to better 
grantmaking decisions‖ (43). Although there are many normative arguments citing the 
potential benefits of involving stakeholders in philanthropic decisions, it is important to 
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review arguments both for and against community involvement in philanthropic literature 
(Brody 2009; Frumkin 2006; Ostrander 1999). 
Arguments against stakeholder involvement in philanthropy reflect the fact that in 
the US private foundations are private institutions that don‘t legally have accountability 
to stakeholders other than requirements to pursue their organizations mission in a 
financially responsible way (Brody 2009). Despite the acknowledgment by scholars that 
foundations don‘t have any legal responsibilities to be accountable to stakeholders there 
seems to be an agreement that foundations (along with nonprofit organizations in general) 
exist for both instrumental and expressive reasons, with organizations having differing 
degrees of accountability to stakeholders (Frumkin 2006). Ostrander (1999) writes, 
 
I have argued that nonprofit‘s can perhaps best be seen as differentially located 
along a continuum containing aspects of both ―public‖ and ―private‖. In this way 
of thinking the question becomes how –and to what extent—foundations are 
public and/or private. This how question refers not to where foundations are 
located in some pre-defined societal sector or sphere—first, second, or third—but 
rather to where they are located on a continuum of being more or less receptive to 
accessibility and influence by varying ―publics,‖ including grantees (260). 
 
One argument in support of stakeholder involvement in grantmaking is that 
community involvement in philanthropy can enhance the civic engagement of individuals 
within their communities. For example, Gibson, Levin and Dietz (2010) conducted an 
evaluation of The Case Foundation‘s grantmaking program and stated that one of the 
reasons The Case Foundation began their citizen led grantmaking program was to directly 
address the lack of civic engagement within communities. They state that ―there was a 
need for the creation of more civic spaces that would allow diverse groups of people to 
connect with each other (including those they might disagree with), discuss what matters 
most, form solutions, and take action together to address them‖ (Introduction). 
Community involvement in grantmaking organizations may also improve civic 
engagement by giving community members a more nuanced understanding of how 
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philanthropy works, which may lead to more of a partnership, trust and understanding of 
philanthropic decisions (Enright 2010; Wang and Wan Wart 2007). 
 Other literature indicates that because stakeholders have an information advantage 
the selection of nonprofit recipients will not only be different, but somehow ‗better‘ than 
traditional funders grantmaking decisions (Bourns 2010; Enright 2010; Ostrander 1999). 
This assumption is explicitly tested in this dissertation. Ostrander (1999) writes that 
community members may have more knowledge of community needs and potential 
solutions. Research finds that community members have different perceptions of 
community needs, solutions to community needs, and differing views on the performance 
of public and nonprofit sector organizations (Kissane 2004, 2007, 2010; Melkers and 
Thomas 1998; Guo and Musso 2007; Wellens and Jegers 2011; Bolduc 1980). 
Furthermore, if community members didn‘t have existing experiential knowledge of the 
performance of a nonprofit, finding this information would have extremely low 
transaction costs (Tinkelman 1999). 
  
Synthesis of Literature: Board Composition and Grant Decisions 
Information Asymmetry and Grant Decisions 
Despite the consensus by academics and practitioners that community boards will 
make different grant decisions than traditional boards theory has not been included in this 
argument. For the purposes of this paper, I utilize contract failure theory to discuss which 
organizational and financial characteristics of nonprofit‘s would be rewarded by 
community boards versus traditional boards.  
Scholars find that all donors are operating in environments with high degrees of 
information asymmetry as the donor is not the eventual recipient of services (Hansmaan 
1980, 1987; Easley and O‘Hara 1986; Krashinsky 1986, 1997). Therefore, determining 
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the quality or performance of a nonprofit (particularly at the time of a donation) is near 
impossible and these characteristics are thought to be unobservable (Hansmaan 1980, 
1987; Easley and O‘Hara 1986; Krashinsky 1986, 1997). Instead, researchers find that 
donors rely on a number of easily observable characteristics that are thought to serve as 
proxies of the quality or performance of a nonprofit (Parsons 2006; Buchheit and Parsons 
2006; Gordon, Knock, and Neely 2009; Calabrese and Grizzle 2010; Church and Parsons 
2008; Weisbrod and Dominguez 1986). 
Nonprofit accounting research focuses on the characteristics of nonprofit‘s that 
influence contributions (an aggregated variable deriving from the contributions line on a 
nonprofit‘s tax form consisting of individual donors, foundation grants, corporate gifts, 
and government gifts and grants). This research typically focuses on two groups of 
variables: measures that are thought to reflect the quality of a nonprofit (age, size, amount 
spent on fundraising) and financial efficiency measures which are thought to reflect the 
efficiency of a nonprofit (Parsons 2006; Buchheit and Parsons 2006; Gordon, Knock, and 
Neely 2009; Calabrese and Grizzle 2010; Church and Parsons 2008; Weisbrod and 
Dominguez 1986). 
 However, there are two reasons we cannot easily appropriate empirical findings 
from this research to generate testable hypotheses about foundation grantmaking.  
First, this research has not isolated the impact these characteristics may have on different 
donors (individuals, foundations, corporations, government entities, federated agencies, 
etc.). In fact there are very few studies isolating how the organizational and financial 
characteristics of nonprofit‘s impact donations and gifts from specific donor types 
(Ashley and Faulk 2010). For example, in Ashley and Faulk (2010), financial efficiency 
has a negative relationship with the amount of foundation grant money received by 
nonprofit‘s. This finding is opposite from previous research conducted using the 
contributions variable, which find that financial efficiency has a positive relationship 
with donations (Parsons 2007; Buchheit and Parsons 2006; Gordon, Knock, and Neely 
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2009; Calabrese and Grizzle 2010; Church and Parsons 2008; Weisbrod and Dominguez 
1986). 
Second, foundations usually have access to more information than individual 
donors as a result of the application process for grant awards. The question then remains 
whether or not foundations use organizational and financial proxies of nonprofit‘s in the 
same ways or differently than other donors when they have access to more information. 
There‘s an assumption that when donors have access to more information that they will 
use this information and change their donation decisions. Yet, this may not be true.  
Research finds that even when donors learn new information about nonprofit‘s they do 
not always change their donation decisions (Szper and Prakash 2011; Sloan 2009). Szper 
and Prakash (2011) write, ―But what if the new information doesn‘t address donors 
salient concerns or the donors have insufficient incentives to embed this new information 
into their decisions?‖ (115).  
For the purposes of this research the disconnect between new information and the 
saliency of information is especially relevant to understanding how and why community 
boards may make different grant decisions than traditional boards. The information 
advantage that community boards are thought to have, because they are embedded in 
their communities, may lead to grant decisions (regardless of the additional information a 
nonprofit provides in its application) that reflect their existing knowledge of which 
organizations are high quality or high performers. 
 Despite the acknowledgement in literature that board members are using some 
heuristics when making grant decisions, a discussion of how and why they are using 
these heuristics is missing from the literature (Gersick and Stone 2004; Grønbjerg, 
Martell, and Paarlberg 2000).  Below I address this gap in the literature by first utilizing 
information asymmetry theory to discuss why community and traditional boards may 
make different grant decisions. I also incorporate two organizational theories, elite and 
network theory, as well as empirical findings from economic models of giving into a 
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discussion of why community and traditional boards may make different grant decisions. 
This literature allows me to generate specific hypotheses in my next chapter concerning 
the organizational and financial characteristics of nonprofit‘s that community and 
traditional boards may reward.  
Governance and Grantmaking: A Multi-Theoretical and Empirical Explanation 
 Both elite and network theory are two organizational theories that are often 
implicit in most philanthropic literature (Arnove 1980; Bombardieri and Robinson 2005; 
Nielson 1972; Odendahl 1989; Jenkins 1998).   
Elite Theory and Grantmaking Decisions 
Scholars indicate that those who lead and govern foundations are members of an 
‗elite‘, a similar concept to Mill‘s (1956) power elite.  These individuals not only have a 
lot of money and prestige, but are also in positions of power to make decisions that have 
significant impacts in society (Karl and Katz 1987). The concept of compositional elitism 
guides this research as traditional board members are thought to award grants to 
nonprofit‘s that reflect their own interests (Galaskiewicz 1985, 1997; Delfin and Tang 
2007; Silver 2007).  ―Private contributions by the elite support institutions that sustain 
their culture, their education, their policy formulation, their status - in short, their 
interests‖ (Odendahl 1990, 232). Arnove (1980) states that when philanthropic boards 
decide to fund certain nonprofit organizations over others they ―have channeled their 
energies and research activities in directions they deemed important‖ (quoted in Karl and 
Katz 1987, 2). Literature using elite theory indicates that in choosing which nonprofit‘s 
receive funding, board members grant decisions are mediated by their own private 




Network Theory and Grantmaking Decisions 
Philanthropic scholars also use network theory in their research. Traditionally, 
foundation board members are found to be more skeptical of nonprofit‘s that aren‘t in 
their existing personal or professional networks (Galaskiewicz 1985, 1997; Burbridge et 
al. 2002; González-Rivera 2009). Middleton (1987) writes, ―the socioeconomic power of 
a grantee agency‘s board and its clientele, rather than the substantive content of its 
program, becomes the standard for allocation‖ (147).  Gronbjerg et. al (2000) 
conceptualize this as a two stage selection process, where nonprofit‘s who are not current 
grantees face competition with other nonprofit‘s based on the familiarity of board 
members with the nonprofit applicants. For nonprofit‘s not in the funders existing 
networks both the initial screening and review of application materials is extremely 
arduous (Grønbjerg, et. al. 2000).  Gronbjerg et. al. (2000) write,  
 
The competitive process thus operates in two stages. First, agencies compete to 
become known to the funder. Once they are known, they compete with other 
known and trusted agencies. For those who enter the latter stage, reliance on 
informal procedures and low turnover rates reduce the time and efforts that both 
parties need to invest, and allow funders to use familiarity and trust as a stand in 
for more objective determinations of an agency‘s capacity to carry out specified 
objectives (37). 
   
Economic Model of Giving and Grantmaking Decisions 
Both the age and size of nonprofit‘s are organizational characteristics that serve as 
signals of a nonprofit‘s legitimacy, reputation, and/or organizational quality (Trussel and 
Parsons 2003; Weisbrod and Dominguez 1986).   Scholars find that age serves as a proxy 
for donors, who are making decisions about the quality and trustworthiness of a nonprofit 
in an uncertain decision making environment. Age serves as a proxy of ―the longevity of 
the firm as a signal of the extent to which it actually provides the level and quality of 
output it purports to supply‖ (Weisbrod and Dominguez 1986, 94).  Older nonprofit‘s 
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receive more donations because ―they develop a greater stock of goodwill with the 
public‖ (Marudas 2004, 87; Weisbrod and Dominguez 1986). Although the findings on 
age are somewhat mixed, most scholars find that older organizations receive larger 
amounts of contributions than younger nonprofit‘s (Szper and Prakash 2011;Okten and 
Weisbrod 2000; Weisbrod and Dominguez 1986).  
An organization‘s size serves as a proxy for its reputation, since large 
organizations have more name recognition (Szper and Prakash 2011).  Size may also 
serve as a proxy for the amount of services or output of a nonprofit (Galaskiewicz 1985). 
Although findings are mixed, most scholars find that contributions are positively related 
to the size of a nonprofit (Gordon, Knock, and Neely 2009; Church and Parsons 2008; 
Buchheit and Parsons 2006).  
Various financial characteristics of nonprofit‘s have also been found to impact 
donations.  For nonprofit‘s fundraising expenses are synonymous to marketing or 
advertising expenses in for profits
7
 (Calabrese and Grizzle, 2010; Church and Parsons 
2008; Okten and Weisbrod 2000; Szper and Prakash 2011; Weisbrod and Dominguez 
1986).  Just as advertising expenses drive future sales in for profit organizations, 
nonprofit‘s‘ fundraising expenses will have a positive impact on future donations 
(Calabrese and Grizzle 2010; Gordon et. al. 2009). Trussel and Parsons (2003) indicate 
that these advertising expenses represent the quantity of information nonprofit‘s can 
provide to potential donors about their organization and its operations.   
Management expenses are generally found to be negatively related to 
contributions, as donors prefer that nonprofit‘s spend money on program expenses over 
other expenses (Greenlee and Brown 1999). Conversely, program expenses serve as a 




 It should be noted that the relationship between fundraising expenses and contributions is complicated.  It 
can have a positive impact on donations by reducing information costs for donors but may also have a 
negative impact by increasing the price of giving (Okten and Weisbrod 2000; Weisbrod and Dominguez 
1986).   
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signal to donors of how committed an organization is to achieving its mission. Trussel 
and Parsons (2003) state that program expenses serve as a proxy for the efficiency of a 
nonprofit since this represents the ―portion of each contribution that reaches the 
organization‘s beneficiaries‖ (3).  Program expenses are generally found to be associated 
with greater contributions. (Greenlee and Trussel 2000; Tuckman and Chang 1991; 
Parsons 2007; Okten and Weisbrod 2000; Weisbrod and Dominguez 1986). 
I also include the sub-sector, or area of activity the nonprofit is active in to control 
for the different giving focuses of foundations.  
 In the first section of this literature review I focused on synthesizing relevant 
literature surrounding the potential relationship between foundation board composition 
and grantmaking decisions. However, just focusing on the characteristics of a foundations 
board misses a number of other explanatory variables a researcher must consider when 
thinking about the relationship between board composition and organizational decisions 
(Brown 2005, 2002; Kochan et al. 2003; Jackson, Joshi, and Erhardt 2003; Zald 1969, 
1967; Bradshaw, Murray, and Wolpin 1996; Siciliano 1996). General governance 
literature indicates that in order to determine how governance impacts organizational 
outcomes both inputs (who is on the board) and process matter (Kochan et al. 2003; 
Hillman and Dalziel 2003).  Specifically, public sector scholars find that the relationship 
between community involvement and organizational decisions is mediated by the design 
or the process of how community members are engaged in a public participation program 
(Ebdon and Franklin 2006). 
 Below I provide a comprehensive review of research on the various design 
elements within a community involvement program and how those design elements 




Does Process Mediate Between Board Composition and Grantmaking Decisions 
 Although existing literature claims that grantmaking decisions by community 
boards will be different than grantmaking decisions by traditional boards, public 
participation literature goes beyond the simple assumption that involving the public will 
impact organizational outcomes (Irvin and Stansbury 2004; Roesner 1978; Franklin and 
Ebdon 2005; Ebdon and Franklin 2006; Thomas 2012; Bourns 2010; Enright 2010; 
González-Rivera 2009; Ostrander 1999). This literature indicates that the relationship 
between governance and grantmaking is very complicated.  
 Public participation scholars find that the impact of community involvement on 
organizational decisions will not automatically yield different organizational decisions 
unless the public involvement program is designed effectively (Ebdon and Franklin 
2006). For example, Franklin and Ebdon (2005) examine community input in budgeting 
decisions and find that community input doesn‘t always lead to a difference in allocation 
decisions. They find that when community input is utilized without particular design 
elements it can lead to merely informing citizens about the budget process rather than 
changing allocation decisions. Yet, none of this research has been applied to grantmaking 
organizations where community involvement alone is thought to impact grantmaking 
decisions. The question remains, what does an effectively designed grantmaking process 
look like and is it similar to the concepts that have been defined in public participation 
literature? 
What Does Effectiveness Mean? 
 The effectiveness of public participation programs has been defined and studied 
in a number of different ways. Roesner (1978) writes about effectiveness in an evaluative 
sense and defines effectiveness as achievement of a public participation programs goals. 
In determining whether or not a public participation program is effective, Rosener (1978) 
indicates that scholars first have to determine if the public participation program itself is a 
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goal or if public participation is seen as a means to another goal. If the public 
participation program itself is the goal it is easy to measure whether or not the program 
was effective since researchers can measure the number of individuals who participate, 
how long they participated, etc. (Rosener 1978).  
 However, if the public participation program is a means to an end understanding 
its effectiveness becomes more difficult.  There are several reasons for this difficulty. 
First, very few public participation programs clearly state their goals or objectives up 
front (Irvin and Stansbury 2004; Ebdon and Franklin 2006; Roesner 1978). Even if goals 
are established for public participation programs at their onset it is difficult to define and 
collect data on abstract goals such as enhanced information use or improved decision 
making. The absence of research evaluating the outcomes of public participation 
programs is confirmed by Ebdon and Franklin (2006) who conduct a literature review on 
this topic and reveal the lack of knowledge on goals and outcomes of public participation.  
For the purposes of this dissertation evaluating whether a program that involved the 
public in a funders grantmaking decisions achieved its goals is also extremely difficult. 
Similar to public sector organizations, philanthropic organizations don‘t clearly define 
their goals or outcomes for public involvement programs.  
 Yet an alternative does exist for understanding effectiveness in public 
participation programs.  Within public participation literature a subset of research focuses 
on the components of an effectively designed public participation program. This research 
finds that effectively designed public participation programs impact organizational 
outcomes. Research that focuses on the design of public participation programs is 
important because there are countless examples of public participation programs that 
largely consist of ―poor planning or execution‖ and not all public participation programs 
are created equal (King, Feltey, and Susel 1998, 317). 
  However, scholars typically study design elements of public participation 
programs in silos with some studies conducted on the relationship between participant 
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selection and organizational outcomes while others examine the relationship between the 
timing of the process and organizational outcomes. Roberts (2004) writes,  
The number of individual, group, and organizational variables, not to mention 
contextual factors that could be considered, can be overwhelming. One reasonable 
response has been to reduce this complexity by focusing on one aspect of direct 
citizen involvement (334).  
Yet, the existing focus by scholars on one aspect of  the design of a public participation 
program contradicts research that effectively designed public participation programs are a 
combination of a large number of variables including,  
. . .careful selection of a representative group of stakeholders, a transparent 
decision-making process to build trust among the participants, clear authority in 
decision making, competent and unbiased group facilitators, regular meetings and 
adequate financial resources to support the group process during the potentially 
long learning and decision making process (Irvin and Stansbury 2004, 61). 
 
Through a comprehensive review of the literature (largely based on work by Ebdon and 
Franklin 2006 and Thomas 2012) I identify a number of design elements that may impact 
organizational decisions. However, these design elements are specifically defined to be 
applicable to grantmaking organizations. For some variables this implies a similar 
definition to what has been identified in existing public participation literature. For other 
variables I specifically amend the definition to be consistent with a nonprofit context. In 
each grouping of factors there is one variable that is defined differently than it is in public 
participation literature. Each of these similarities or differences is explicitly defined 
below. 
Authenticity of Public Involvement 
Existing research defines the authenticity of a public participation program based 
on two variables, opportunities and timing. Franklin and Ebdon (2005) define 
opportunities as allowing citizens to have ―multiple, interactive opportunities for citizen 
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input‖ (171). A public participation program designed without opportunities for 
interactivity between citizens and organizational staff (such as a public hearing) is 
reflective of a lack of sincerity in utilizing citizen input in organizational decisions and 
consequently doesn‘t lead to a change in organizational decisions (King, Feltey, and 
Susel 1998). On the other hand citizen panels and advisory boards often generate 
differences in organizational decisions as they are reflective of sincere utilization of 
citizen input (Ebdon and Franklin 2006).  
Timing is also thought to play an important role in the authenticity of a public 
participation process (Abelson, Forest, Eyles, Smith, Martin and Gauvin 2003).  As one 
component of an effectively designed process citizen involvement must occur early 
(Thomas 1995; Ebdon and Franklin 2006; Roberts 2004; Innes and Booher 2004; 
Walters, Aydelotte, and Miller 2000). When citizen input is utilized early in a public 
participation process it is thought to reflect a sincere effort on the part of an organization 
in actually utilizing the citizen input it solicits.  
Participant Selection 
The participant selection process is one of the most frequently researched 
components of an effectively designed community involvement program (Irvin and 
Stansbury 2004; Roberts 2004; Thomas 1995; Leach 2006; Brady, Verba, and Schlozman 
1995). Researchers have found that many outcomes of community involvement programs 
are negatively impacted by who participates. Across many public participation programs 
those citizens who are eligible to participate often don‘t. Furthermore, in some public 
participation programs only dominant groups or those with special interests in a policy 
become involved (Irvin and Stansbury 2004; Roberts 2004; Thomas 1995; Leach 2006; 
Brady, Verba, and Schlozman 1995).  
However, there are mixed results on whether or not who participates actually 
matters. Scholars find that who serves in a public participation program may not be as 
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important as we may normatively think it is (Brady, Verba, and Schlozman 1995). In fact, 
political scientists find that the actual policy preferences of those who participate in these 
programs and those who don‘t are not significantly different (Brady, Verba, and 
Schlozman 1995).  Rather it is the focus and intention the organization sets on recruiting 
a diverse array of constituents that is critical in an effectively designed participation 
process (Brady, Verba, and Schlozman 1995; Franklin and Ebdon 2005).  There is 
scholarly consensus that careful selection of representative stakeholders has a direct 
impact on the outcomes of public participation programs (Irvin and Stansbury 2004).  
One variable that defines an effective participant selection process is community 
members being solicited to participate in a number of different ways or what Thomas 
(2012) calls aggressive recruitment. Additionally, an organization that uses a number of 
different mechanisms to invite participants is also thought to be an important component 
of an effectively designed participant selection process since awareness of public 
participation programs are typically only available to individuals with a higher 
socioeconomic status  (Franklin and Ebdon 2005).  
In addition to aggressively inviting a variety of citizens the second variable that 
composes an effective participant selection process is an organization that focuses on 
having a community board that is selected to be demographically representative of 
particular communities or groups. I conceptualize this variable as purposeful recruitment. 
Purposeful recruitment is defined as a grantmaker that sets an intention and selects 
participants to be representative of a particular community or group.  Intentionally 
selecting a demographically representative community board indicates that a grantmaker 
is interested in having a wide variety of community members with potentially differing 
viewpoints involved in grantmaking decisions.  Furthermore, an organization that focuses 
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on purposeful recruitment is likely knowledgeable about which particular groups it is 
important to engage. 
Deliberation Process 
Finally, understanding the deliberation process within a public participation 
program is also emerging as a critical component of an effectively designed public 
participation program (Thomas 2012). One aspect of an effectively designed deliberation 
process is that an organization educates citizens about community issues (Webler, Tuler 
and Krueger 2001). Therefore, in the deliberation process citizens will utilize not just 
their own knowledge about a particular problem but will also incorporate external 
perspectives.  
 An effectively designed deliberation process also allows citizens the opportunity 
to record their individual perspectives or viewpoints (Franklin and Carberry-George 
1999). Presence of this variable is indicative of an organization that values the individual 
contributions of community members. Recording individual evaluations also sends a 
signal to community members of agency transparency and legitimacy, indicating that 
their views matter and will be taken into account when decisions are made (Rowe and 
Frewer 2000; Webler, Tuler and Krueger 2001). 
Finally, Thomas (2012) is one of the few public participation scholars to 
explicitly (many scholars allude to these design elements) focus on the presence of a 
trained neutral facilitator and the opportunity for community members to make decisions 
within small groups. This work is largely guided by researchers‘ findings across 
disciplines that small groups increase opportunities for meaningful collaboration 
(Abelson et. al. 2003; Ostrom 1990; Thomas 2012) McCool and Guthrie (2001) state that 
small groups allow opportunities for learning and they identify this as one dimension of 
success in a public participation program.  
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Additionally, having a neutral facilitator lead discussions is critical since it is 
important for agency staff to be seen as independent (Rowe and Frewer 2000; Thomas 
2012). A neutral facilitator can also prevent situations where one community member 
uses ―their power or authority to inhibit the conversation of others‖ (Santos and Chess 
2003, 270; Webler, Tuler and Krueger 2001). 
From this comprehensive review of the literature I develop and test hypotheses 
about the relationship between board composition and grantmaking decisions. I also 
develop a framework of an effectively designed participation program that I then use to 
guide the case study research I undertake in phase II of this dissertation. Finally in phase 
III of this dissertation I analyze the similarities and differences between grant decisions 
of community and traditional boards taking into account the design of a grantmakers 





INTEGRATED THEORY, HYPOTHESES AND MODELS 
Existing literature on donation decisions finds that all donors are operating in 
environments with a high degree of information asymmetry in that at the time of a 
donation decision, they are highly limited in their ability to monitor a nonprofit‘s 
performance (Parsons 2007; Buchheit and Parsons 2006; Gordon, Knock, and Neely 
2009; Calabrese and Grizzle 2010; Church and Parsons 2008;  Weisbrod and Dominguez 
1986). Consequently, donors rely on a number of organizational and financial 
characteristics of nonprofit‘s that are easily observable characteristics found on a 
nonprofit‘s website or their 990 tax form (Saxton, Neely and Guo 2011). These 
organizational and financial characteristics are used by donors as proxies for the quality 
and performance of nonprofit‘s   
I also posit that all donors are operating in environments with high degrees of 
information asymmetry. However, I argue that because community members are much 
more embedded in their communities (as compared to traditional board members), often 
living and working in the communities where they are making grant decisions, they will 
use organizational and financial characteristics of nonprofit‘s in different ways than 
existing literature on donation decisions would indicate (Kissane 2004; 2007; 2010; 
Boulduc 1980). I argue that because community members are embedded in the 
communities, where they are making grant decisions, they will be more aware of which 
nonprofit‘s are high quality or high performing and won‘t rely on organizational and 
financial characteristics of nonprofit applicants when making grant decisions.  
Below I supplement information asymmetry and generate hypotheses from two 
organizational theories (elite and network theory) used to explain traditional boards grant 
making decisions. I also generate hypotheses building on the economic model of giving, 
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which describes the organizational and financial characteristics that donors use when 
making their donation decisions. 
Elite Theory Hypothesis 
Researchers who use elitist theory in their work on grantmaking often assert that 
foundations give to more professional, well known organizations
8
 (Arnove 1980; 
Bombardieri and Robinson 2005; Nielson 1972; Odendahl 1989; Jenkins 1998).  Since 
community boards are embedded in their communities they won‘t rely on the 
professionalism of a nonprofit as a proxy for its quality or reputation. Instead, community 
boards will select a higher percentage of grassroots
9
 (a measure of the professionalization 
of the nonprofit based on the type of 990 each nonprofit files) nonprofit‘s than traditional 
boards. 
Hypothesis 1: Community boards are more likely than traditional boards to select 
grassroots grantees.  
Network Theory Hypothesis 
I also hypothesize that in contrast to a traditional board of directors who would 
make funding decisions based on familiarity with nonprofit‘s, community boards would 
be more open to funding organizations beyond their existing networks. Traditionally, 
receiving a grant in a prior year both reduces the degree of asymmetric information 
between donors and nonprofit‘s and also serves as a powerful predictor of whether or not 




 Yet, scholars examining these differences empirically often find very small or nonexistent differences 
between funding of more traditional and alternative nonprofit‘s (Jenkins 1998; Delfin and Tang 2007) 
9
 In the variable description section I define in detail how I created this variable. It is important to note that 
this is not a measure of the size of an organization. Instead, it is a measure of the professionalization of the 
nonprofit based on the type of 990 the organization completes. It is an ordinal level variable with a 1 
representing those nonprofit‘s that have revenues less than $25,000 and do not have to complete a 990, a 2 
representing those nonprofit‘s who have revenues between $25,000 and $500,000 who complete a 990 EZ 
and a 3 representing those nonprofit‘s who complete a 990. 
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an organization receives a grant in a subsequent year (Grønbjerg et al.  2000). However, 
community boards are relying on information about nonprofit applicants based on 
personal experiences or word-of-mouth from other community members. Consequently 
they would be more open to funding ‗new‘ applicants (a variable representative of 
whether or not the nonprofit received funding from that particular funder in the previous 
year).
10
 Therefore, I hypothesize the following: 
Hypothesis 2: Community boards are more likely than traditional boards to fund 
new grantees (those who had not been funded in the previous year)  
Donation Decision Hypotheses 
Since community members are likely making grant decisions based on their 
personal experiences or word-of-mouth I hypothesize that community boards will also be 
more open to funding different types of nonprofit applicants than a traditional board.  
Instead of traditional boards, which would largely fund older, larger, nonprofit‘s I 
hypothesize that community members will not use these characteristics as proxies for a 
nonprofit‘s quality or performance. Community boards will be more likely to award 
grants to small,  young organizations and will not use a nonprofit‘s age or size as proxies 
for quality or performance (Grønbjerg, Martell, and Paarlberg 2000; Delfin and Tang 
2007; Silver 2007).  I hypothesize the following: 
Hypothesis 3: Community boards are more likely than traditional boards to select 
young grantees. 




 It is important to note that neither the grassroots nature nor whether the nonprofit was a previous grantee 
have been used in existing studies to predict donations or grant success. These are two organizational 
characteristics that I add to my models as they are 1) frequently discussed in philanthropic literature and 2) 
likely play a large role in funding decisions. 
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Hypothesis 4: Community boards are more likely than traditional boards to select 
small grantees. 
 
I also hypothesize that the existing (often experiential) knowledge community 
boards have about the capacity, performance and quality of nonprofit applicants will 
allow them to not be influenced by the advertising expenses of an organization. Therefore 
I hypothesize the following: 
Hypothesis 5: Community boards are more likely than traditional boards to select 
grantees that spend less on fundraising. 
 
Additionally, for both community and traditional boards, neither management nor 
program expenses will serve as a proxy of a nonprofit‘s commitment to its mission. Since 
members of the community board are embedded in their communities they are aware of 
which nonprofit applicants are committed to fulfillment of its missions. For traditional 
boards, literature indicates that they are more likely to give to organizations that are 
already in their existing networks, negating any scrutiny of their financial metrics. 
Therefore, we would not expect a relationship between these financial metrics and 
grantee selection.  I hypothesize that the amount nonprofit‘s spend on management or 
program expenses will not impact whether a nonprofit is selected by a community or 
traditional board.    
Hypothesis 6: There will be no statistically significant difference between the 
management expenses of community and traditional board nonprofit grantees. 
Hypothesis 7: There will be no statistically significant difference between the 






Table 1:  Hypotheses 1 – 7:  Organizational and financial determinants of grantees 
  Professional Grantee 
Last Year 
















Less No Difference No 
Difference 
 
A summary of my hypotheses are in table 1. My final regression equation is as follows: 
Community or Traditional Board Grantee  =  β0 + β1(Size)t-1 +  β2(Age) + β4(Fundraising 
Expenses or Admin. Expenses) t-1  + β5(Program Expenses) t-1  + β6-9(Sub Sector 
Controls) +   ε  
 In addition to quantitative analyses I also conduct case studies of two foundations 
to determine how the design of a public participation program may impact grantee 
selection. Through a comprehensive literature review I identify several components of an 
effectively designed community involvement program, one where community input 
yields differences in organizational decisions. I then generate a framework which I use to 
guide the qualitative data and analysis I conduct in phase II of this research. Finally, in 
phase III of this research I analyze grant decisions of community and traditional boards 
utilizing findings from my qualitative work to build regression models that take into 







Framework of Design Elements that may Impact Grantee Selection 
Through a comprehensive literature review I find 8 variables which compose an 
effectively designed public participation program. In figure 1 I purposefully define these 
variables in order for them to be applicable within the nonprofit context. For some 
variables this means appropriating a definition similar to one used in the public sector 





Factors Variables Definition specific to Grantmaking Organizations 
Authenticity of 
public involvement 
    
  Opportunities Application reviews and/or site visits are initiated and 
led by citizens 
  Final decision 
making authority 
Community boards grantmaking decisions are not 
filtered through another board. Instead, community 
boards decisions are reflective of final grant awards 
Participant 
Selection 
    
  Diversity of 
invitation 
mechanisms used 
Participants are solicited to serve on the community 
board in a number of ways  




Participants are purposively selected in order to be 
demographically representative of particular groups or 
communities 




   
Deliberation 
Process 
    
  Educates The grantmaking agency provides information on 




Community members individually record their 
evaluation of nonprofit applicants at some point in 
the grantmaking process. 
 Small group 
interaction occurs 
within a large 
group process 
Evaluation of nonprofit applicants takes place 
primarily through a small group deliberation 
process. 
 Trained (neutral) 
facilitator leads 
group  
The grantmaking agency has dedicated staff that 
facilitates group deliberation. This staff member 
remains neutral and does not influence group 
decisions.  
Figure 1 Continued: Description of design elements within grantmaking organizations 
Authenticity Defined for Nonprofit Research 
I define authentic opportunities for community involvement in a similar way to 
public sector scholars, consisting of two variables – opportunities to take initiative and 
38 
 
timing. A grantmaking organization that creates authentic opportunities for community 
boards allows community members to lead application reviews, ask questions on site 
visits and make recommendations for funding.  
The second variable I include in an authentic public participation program is 
defined differently in my framework than it is currently defined in existing public sector 
literature. For public sector scholars, community involvement at the beginning of an 
organizations decision process is thought to be a component of an effectively designed 
public participation program (Thomas 1995; Ebdon and Franklin 2006; Roberts 2004; 
Innes and Booher 2004; Walters, Aydelotte, and Miller 2000). Yet, when grantmaking 
organizations involve community members they are typically always involved at the 
beginning of the funding process, primarily conducting the review of applications of 
nonprofit‘s who are applying. Where many of these organizations differ is in the 
involvement of community members in final award decisions. For some organizations 
community boards‘ final decisions are merely recommendations or filtered through 
another board. Therefore, I define effective timing as community boards grant decisions 
serving as the final grant awards. 
Participant Selection Defined for Nonprofit Research 
I define an effective participant selection process consisting of two variables – the 
invitation and representation process. Similar to public sector organizations, a grantmaker 
with an effective invitation process solicits citizen involvement in multiple ways or what 
Thomas (2012) calls ‗aggressive recruitment‘.  This is consistent with an organization 
that values a variety of constituents being involved in the grantmaking process.  
In addition to aggressively inviting a variety of citizens the second variable that 
composes a participant selection process is an organization that thinks about and focuses 
on recruiting participants that are demographically representative of particular 
communities or groups. In public sector literature this is often called purposeful 
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recruitment. Purposeful recruitment is defined as a grantmaker that sets an intention and 
selects participants to be representative of a particular community or group.  Intentionally 
selecting a demographically representative community board indicates that a grantmaking 
organization is interested in having a wide variety of community members with 
potentially differing viewpoints involved in grantmaking decisions.  Furthermore, an 
organization that focuses on purposeful recruitment is likely knowledgeable about which 
particular groups it is important to engage. 
Deliberation Process Defined for Nonprofit Research 
The deliberation process is defined similarly to frameworks developed in public 
sector research by Franklin and Ebdon (2005) and Thomas (2012). An effectively 
designed deliberation process consists of a grantmaking organization that conducts 
training and informs community members about the particular issue(s) their organization 
is trying to address.  Additionally, community members are provided opportunities to 
individually record their own opinions and perspectives about applicants before 
conducting discussions in small group (consisting of 4 or less individuals) settings. 
Finally, an effectively designed deliberation process has a neutral (non-voting) staff 
member as a facilitator for these small group discussions. 
Design Elements and Grantmaking Decisions 
 Research indicates that only public participation programs that are effectively 
designed will yield differences in allocation decisions (Ebdon and Franklin 2006). 
Therefore, I posit that the design elements of each grantmakers community involvement 
programs will impact whether or not there are differences in grant decisions between 
community and traditional boards.  I examine the same organizational and financial 
characteristics identified in phase I, removing organizations identified in phase II (the 
qualitative component) identified as having effectively designed public participation 
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programs. I suspect that the average grantmakers community involvement program is not 
effectively designed (largely due to constraints in resources and a lack of organizational 
learning). Consequently, I hypothesize that once the design of a public participation 
program is taken into account grant decisions between community and traditional boards 
will be more similar. 
 In the next chapter I discuss the data and methods I utilize to test the hypotheses 
and framework I‘ve developed, providing a more complete understanding of the 




DATA AND METHODS 
Sampling Strategy 
There are no lists of grantmakers that use both community boards and traditional 
boards. Therefore, through convenience sampling (internet searches and contacting 
philanthropic practitioners I knew personally) I include six funders in this research who 
have both a community and traditional board.  Foundations had to satisfy two criteria to 
be included in this research. First, each funder must delineate (either on their 990 or on 
their website) which board the grant came from.
11
  Additionally, the community board 
has to make grant decisions that are completely separate from the grant decisions made 
by the traditional board.  For example, this means that the community board staff should 
not be the same as the traditional board staff.  It could also mean that community board 
members grant decisions are not filtered through another more traditional board.  
Although this is a high standard of selection for this study, since I am specifically 
interested in the role of community input in grant decisions, I am only examining those 
boards where grant awards are truly reflective of community input.  My results will only 
apply to foundations that have distinctive community and traditional boards since this is 
the primary criterion for inclusion in my study. Unfortunately, there is no data that details 
the range or number of funders who have distinctive community and traditional boards.  
Both Community Foundations, United Way affiliates and other public foundations 
are thought to be philanthropic organizations that should involve community members in 
grantmaking (since they raise their money from the public) (Ostrander 1999). However, 




 Delineating which board or pool of funds a grant came from is not required by the IRS on a foundations 
website. In fact foundations only have to list the names of the nonprofit organizations they gave to. 
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in my sample I‘ve included a range of different ‗types‘ of foundations (both public and 
private)
12
  in order for my results to have some external validity by including the 
spectrum of funders (See Figure 2) involving the public in grant decisions across the 
United States.
13
   
 
Types of Foundations Private Foundations 
 
Public Foundations 
Sample of Funders 
1. Foundation A 
 
2. Foundation B 
 
3. Foundation C 
1. Foundation 1 
 
2. Foundation 2 
 
3. Foundation 3 
 




I conduct a variation of an explanatory design mixed methods approach called the 
follow up explanations model. A visual diagram of this mixed methods approach is 
provided in figure 3 below. In this mixed methods research design there are three phases 
of data collection and analysis. In the first phase (hereafter called Phase I) I collect and 
analyze quantitative data to first determine if there are differences between the 
nonprofit‘s selected by community and traditional boards. I discover these differences 
using t test differences of means and regression analysis.  




 See Appendix B for an overview of different foundation types.  
13
 In the 2009 Grassroots Grantmakers biennial ―State of the Field‖ survey 25% of the respondents were 
private foundations. 
14
 Some of the foundations in my sample are easily identifiable if more descriptive information was 
provided. IRB was secured to conduct this study and I also promised respondents both confidentiality and 




Once I‘ve determined whether differences exist in the grantmaking decisions of 
community and traditional boards I then collect and analyze qualitative data in Phase 2. 
However, the qualitative data is specifically used in a follow-up explanations mixed 
methods model to identify ―specific quantitative findings that need additional 
explanation, such as statistical differences among groups, individuals who scored at 
extreme levels, or unexpected results‖ (Creswell and Clark 2007, p. 72). Quantitative 
analysis of the differences between grants given by community and traditional boards is 
an incomplete picture of the impact that community involvement may have on grant 
decisions. This is particularly true since regression analysis does not take into account the 
absence or presence of components of an effectively designed community involvement 
program, which existing literature finds is important to consider.
15
  
Therefore, I collect and analyze qualitative data to discuss how the absence or 
presence of an effectively designed community involvement program may mediate the 
relationship between board composition and grant decisions with a case study approach, 
investigating this relationship within two foundations.  
Finally, I combine the quantitative and qualitative data together in phase III, using 
the findings from the qualitative component of my research to build and analyze a second 
set of regression models. By mixing the quantitative and qualitative data ―together they 
form a more complete picture of the problem than they do when standing alone‖ 
(Creswell and Clark 2007, p. 7). I consequently reinterpret my quantitative data in lieu of 
my qualitative findings. 
Below I describe the data and analyses I conduct this research. 
 




 I could not include controls in the model for each foundation because the unit of analysis is the nonprofit 
organization awarded grant and including foundation characteristics would be methodologically 
inappropriate. Furthermore, even when I attempted this the number of nonprofit‘s awarded grants within 


















Figure 3: Explanatory Design Mixed Methods Model: Reproduced from Creswell and 
Clark 2007, p. 73. 
Phase I: Data and Methods 
Quantitative Data 
The unit of analysis in my regression models is the nonprofit organization awarded a 
grant by each funder in 2008.  I collected both organizational and financial information of 
grantees and non-grantees. To compile this information I first collected the names of each 
nonprofit awarded a grant in 2008 from each funders 990 form. I then conducted an 
extensive search using the National Center for Charitable Statistics, Guidestar and google 






















merged this list with the 2007
16
 Core 990 Public Charity files to secure each nonprofit‘s 
organizational and financial information.  Since detailed revenue and expense 
information is not available in the Core Files I manually collected this information from 
each grantees 2007 990 form.
17
   This yields 617 unique grantees.
18
   
 
Table 2: Distribution of grants by each funder 
 
Although many scholars are concerned about using financial data
19
 from a 
nonprofit‘s tax forms (since many organizations misreport or make mistakes on their tax 
forms) I restrict my data to nonprofit‘s that reporting meaningful financial information 
(Tinkelman and Mankaney 2007). Following Tinkelman and Mankaney (2007) I restrict 
my data to grantees that report fundraising and administrative expenses over $1,000 and  




 I lag all of the financial variables on year in concert with previous research indicating that this may take 
care of some endogenity issues (Marudas 2004; Tinkelman and Neely 2010) 
17
 Although overall I have 724 grants made by 6 funders during 2008 for the purposes of my analysis I 
exclude grants made to foundations, public festivals, churches, international nonprofit‘s, schools, 
government organizations and grantees I could not find any information on.  I exclude this data because I 
would not be able to secure similar organizational and financial variables to the nonprofit‘s in my sample. 
18
 I ran multinomial logistic models to determine if there was a difference between grantees who were 
selected by both a community and traditional board but none of the financial or organizational determinants 
were significant. This is likely because the number of organizations that received a grant from both board 
types was small (See Appendix F for multinomial logit results). 
19
 Appendix G includes a correlation matrix of all variables included in the final regression model 







Funders Name     
Foundation A Private 86 16 102 
Foundation B Private 9 22 31 
Foundation C Private 57 36 93 
Foundation 1 Public 122 92 214 
Foundation 2 Public 78 4 82 
Foundation 3 Public 60 35 95 
Total  412 205 617 
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positive amounts of contributions, as scholars find that their financial data is more 
reliable.
20
   
In addition to examining the differences in organizational and financial 
characteristics of the 617 grant recipients funded by community and traditional boards I 
also examined the preferences of community and traditional boards in the nonprofit 
marketplace. I ask, when community and traditional boards are reviewing grant 
applications, which organizational and financial characteristics do they reward?  
However, I do not have access to nonprofit‘s who applied for grants and/or those who 
were rejected.
21
 I only have data (from each foundations tax form) on the nonprofit‘s who 
received grants. Yet, the organizational and financial characteristic of the nonprofit‘s 
awarded grants does allow me to include 955
22
 comparable nonprofit organizations that 
did not receive grants in regression analysis. I use the 955 comparable non-grantees to 
construct a hypothetical nonprofit marketplace and build a probability model for logistic 
regression. Non-recipient organizations are IRS Form 990 reporting 501(c)3 
organizations that did not receive a grant from any of the foundations in my sample 
during 2008, yet complete a tax form and are listed in the National Center for Charitable 
Statistics Core Files.  
I selected non-grant recipient organizations using multiple selection criteria. First, 
I restricted the data to nonprofit organizations that are likely to seek foundation grant 
support. I reduced the data to organizations that rely on donation income for some portion 
of their annual revenue by excluding nonprofit organizations that reported less than 




 I also run descriptive statistics and regression results without Tinkelman controls. These results have 
similar findings and I include one of the regression models without Tinkelman controls in Appendix H to 
demonstrate this. 
21
 Foundations are not legally required to list this information and most don‘t.  
22
 This is a 10% sample from the NCCS data of non-grantees. I took a 10% sample in order to have a 
comparable sample size to my grantee data. I ran the regressions with several different 10% samples in 
order to ensure my results were consistent across samples. The only major changes occurred in the 
significance of the sub-sector variables which are control variables in the regression analyses. 
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$1,000 in contributions on their 990 form. Second, since most of the funders in my 
sample only give in specific counties. I restricted the sample of non-grantees to counties 
where grant recipients are located using fips (Federal Information Processing Standard) 
codes. Finally, I restricted the sample of non-grantees to nonprofit organizations that fit 
the expressed giving priorities of sampled foundations. I referred to the National 
Taxonomy of Exempt Entities (NTEE-CC) subsector categories of the grant recipient 
organizations as proxies for the grant priorities of the sampled foundations and excluded 
nonprofit organizations in the sample that did not fall within one of the grantee NTEE-
CC subsector categories. This yields a sample of 955 non-grantees.  Similar to the grantee 
sample I manually collected detailed revenue and expense information of non-grantees 





 logistic regression models. In the first, the dependent variable is coded 
1 if a nonprofit is awarded a grant by a community board and 0 if a nonprofit was not 
awarded a grant (non-grantee) by a community board. In the second regression model the 
dependent variable is coded 1 if a nonprofit is awarded a grant by a traditional board and 
0 if a nonprofit was not awarded a grant (non-grantee) by a traditional board.  
I examine my hypotheses through two groups of independent variables, 
organizational and financial characteristics of nonprofit‘s that are found to influence 
donations and grant decisions in existing literature.  The organizational characteristics 
include the professionalism of a nonprofit (derived from literature using elite theory to 




 I also ran a model including nonprofit‘s that received a grant from both community and traditional 
boards. However, the N is so small for nonprofit‘s that received a grant from both a community and 
traditional board (33) that none of the variables were significant.  
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discuss foundation giving), whether the nonprofit received a grant in the previous year 
from a funder (derived from literature using network theory to discuss foundation 
giving), age and size (natural log of total assets) of the nonprofit. The financial 
characteristics include the amount a nonprofit spends on fundraising, management, and 
program expenses. Both age, size, fundraising, management and program expenses are all 
variables found to influence donation decisions in the standard economic model of giving 
(Weisbrod and Dominguez 1986). 
Description of Organizational Variables 
The professionalism of a nonprofit is an ordinal level variable I created based on 
whether the nonprofit completed a 990 and if they did which 990 form they completed. I 
conceptualize the type of 990 a nonprofit completes as a signal of the level of 
professionalism an organization is trying to communicate with stakeholders. In no way 
does this indicate that an organization that completes a 990 does more or less grassroots 
activities or work than a nonprofit who completes an alternative 990 form. Despite the 
rules the IRS has for nonprofit‘s completing tax forms based on their size, in this sample 
a number of organizations ignore these rules and complete a 990, even though they aren‘t 
required.  A 1 represents an organization that did not complete a 990, 2 represents‘ an 
organization that completed a 990 EZ while a 3 represents an organization that completed 
a 990. Each of these categories represents an increased signal of professionalism that 
nonprofits are sending to various stakeholders.
24
 




 ANOVA test in differences of mean were examined to determine if there were any statistically 
significant differences in the asset sizes of nonprofit‘s who were filling out different 990 forms. None of 
these tests were statistically significant indicating that IRS rules based on size do not determine which 
forms nonprofits complete, but rather it is a strategy pursued by nonprofits who want to be viewed by 
various stakeholder groups are more professional. 
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To determine if a nonprofit was a previous grantee I compiled a list of each 
funders‘ grants during the previous year from their 2007 990 form. This variable is 
dichotomous with a 1 representing receipt of a grant in a previous year and 0 representing 
not receiving a grant in the previous year.  
Age was created by subtracting the organizations rule date (or when the 
organization obtained their official recognition by the IRS) from the grant award year 
(2008). 
 I also use the log
25
of total assets as the size variable in my regression models.  
Description of Financial Variables 
The second group of independent variables are three financial variables used in 
existing research on donation decisions; the amount an organization spends on 
fundraising, the amount an organization spends on management expenses and the amount 
an organization spends on program expenses. I cannot include all three expense variables 
in one regression because they typically add up to the total expenses for an organization 
and I would have significant problems with multicollinearity.
26
 Instead, in one regression 
model I include program and fundraising expenses while in the second I include program 
and administrative expenses.   
Control Variables 
I use the National Taxonomy of Exempt Entities (NTEE) major sub-sector five 
category listing (human services, arts, culture and humanities, health, education and 




 Logging variables has been demonstrated in existing research to help reduce heteroskedasticity 
(Tinkelman and Neely 2010). 
26
 As I am using these detailed expense amounts in my final regression models I am only analyzing those 




other).  The reference group is ―other,‖ which includes environment, international, 
mutual benefit, religious, public and societal benefit and unknown nonprofit‘s. 
 
 
Phase II: Data and Methods 
Qualitative Data 
In addition to collecting and analyzing quantitative data on the nonprofit‘s 
selected by community and traditional boards I also collect qualitative data. I use a case 
study approach in collecting my qualitative data going in depth within two public 
foundations (Foundation 1 and Foundation 2). I choose these two foundations to conduct 
case studies on for two reasons: 1) The organizations are similar in many respects. They 
are both intermediary organizations that raise money from the public with very distinct 
community and traditional grant programs. They also give a similar amount of money 
through their community boards ($800,000 and $500,000 respectively); 2) However, the 
design or the process of how they involve community members in grant decisions is 
markedly different.  Foundation 1 has many elements of an effectively designed 
community involvement program while Foundation 2 does not. By choosing these 
contrasting cases I am able to determine whether or not the absence or presence of an 
effectively designed public participation program impacts grantee selection. 
I collect agency documentation and interviews in this phase of my data collection. 
First, I reviewed all publicly available agency documentation (this included external 
documents like newspaper reports and internal agency documents such as list of grantees, 
funded project descriptions, applications for community board members, etc.) to develop 
both a history and understanding of each organization before I conducted interviews.  
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After collecting this data I interviewed three individuals (a staff member working 
with the traditional board, a staff member working with the community board, and a 
community board member
27
) within each foundation.  See Appendix A for the interview 
protocol.
28
  Although I am collecting data primarily from individual interviewees my 
interview questions are about organizational level decisions and processes since this is 
my unit of analysis (Yin 2009).  
Below I provide an overview of the two Foundations I include in this case study. 
Overview of Foundation 1 
Foundation 1 is one of the oldest public foundations in the United States. It has 
two distinct grantmaking boards within the organization. The traditional boards grant 
process has a lot of staff involvement and staff are responsible for reviewing grant 
applications and conducting site visits. A staff member working with the traditional board 
describes the grantmaking process as one where,  
Staff take the lead on the individual grants even if their approved by the board. 
The board deals with overall strategy – should we be doing more education, 
should we be focusing more on micro enterprise and small business startup and 
how would we do that instead of a little $20,000 grant.   
 
Although the traditional board doesn‘t deal with the details of individual grants they are 
responsible ―to decide what our initiatives are and allocate money between the initiatives 
and the responsive grantmaking‖ (Staff member working with the traditional board).   




 In both foundations I was unable to get access to a traditional board member for interviews. 
28
 I developed and refined the interview by conducting a pilot interview with a local agency who utilizes 
community boards. Pilot testing interview questions is thought to be a critical component of case study 
research since it can ―cover both substantive and methodological issues‖ (Yin 2009, p. 93). 
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          The community board of Foundation 1 is composed of approximately 27 local 
residents who serve as a grantmaking committee. The community board awards $800,000 
in grants annually. Each resident is either nominated (through local nonprofit‘s, existing 
members of the community board, staff of the community board, etc.) or completes an 
application and serves a three year term. In the community board, staff is relegated to 
more administrative tasks while the community board is active in all aspects of the 
grantmaking process. The community board makes final decisions as to which 
organizations are funded, which are not, and the amounts each organization receives. 
Although the purpose of the community board is to fund grassroots organizations more 
formal, larger nonprofit‘s can apply since they can apply for a grassroots project within 
their larger organization. A staff member working with the community board describes 
the grants awarded. 
   
But it cannot be about ya know, we‘re gonna hand out food to people or just a 
strictly charity type of thing. So even if it is a charity thing like that there has to 
be that give and get piece of it where people who are receiving are also giving in 
some way and those relationships are being built.  
 
Involving community members in the grants process is thought to be especially critical as 
the board of the traditional foundation is not thought to have the same insight into 
community issues. When asked why this same fund isn‘t run with a traditional board a 
staff member working with the community board says,  
 
Well I mean theres a lot of reasons. Number one, I don‘t think – I don‘t know if 
the board -  the board of Foundation 1 is dealing with multi-million dollar, 
million dollar grants so one is they would not have the time to really look into 
this. They wouldn‘t – they don‘t have the knowledge of the community members. 
Those folks are living in the neighborhoods – their really part of the fabric of the 
community. The board of Foundation 1 lives out in the suburbs and their um, ya 
know – their all really wealthy people. So their knowledge of this is limited – of 
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the issues that are going on in the community. The second big thing is – this takes 
a lot of time and attention and ya know, it‘s very relational. They don‘t have time 
for that – and some may have an interest in it but I don‘t know if they do. 
 
A community board member describes a similar viewpoint on the grant decisions made 
by the traditional board. 
 
9 times out of 10 their out of touch. It‘s just here‘s a group here‘s their proposal, 
we‘re gonna fund them money and then we‘ll let them come in and interview. . . 
.I‘ve seen some of those people at Foundation 1 and some of them are seriously 
just out of touch. Because you‘ll see certain things that they fund. . . and there are 
other needs that could strengthen our neighborhood, not $100,000 worth of art. 
 
Foundation 2 has designed its community involvement program in a very different way 
than Foundation 1. However, the perspective that community involvement in the grants 
process is critical to a more informed assessment of community and nonprofit needs is 
similar. 
Overview of Foundation 2 
Since 1976 Foundation 2 has been awarding grants to nonprofit‘s through their 
traditional board. Since 2003 the foundation has also been awarding grants to nonprofit‘s 
through their community board. Each year the community board awards approximately 
$500,000 in grants.  
Foundation 2‘s community board structure is unique in that their community 
board is composed of an equal number of community members and donors who 
contribute to this fund as well as one staff member who votes. In fact, at one point in the 
foundations history all grants were awarded by community boards. However, due to some 
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administrative changes community members involvement on the traditional board is 
primarily to review applications and conduct site visits while final grant decisions are 
made by staff.   A staff member working with the traditional board describes the 
involvement of community members on their traditional boards as an ancillary one 
where,  
. . .our CFB (community funding board) they are treated more as thought partners 
- that they help us assess the landscape of each of the areas, they help us assess 
what‘s going on economically, what‘s happening politically and they give us a 
feel for what the landscape looks like in each of those areas. We still meet 
together, they still conduct the site visits and meet with the organizations. They 
come back and we discuss the landscape and in the context of that work we look 
at that work and assess where there fit is in the context of that landscape. . . Based 
on that analysis is how we end up finally making grantee decisions. 
 
On the other hand there is one specific fund within the foundation where a community 
board is responsible for making grant decisions and final grant decisions are not filtered 
through staff members. The involvement of community members in the grants process 
for this fund is critical as a staff member working with the community board mentions. 
Well I really love that we involve folks from the community in our process 
because I think people can get really removed from what‘s happening. And as a 
foundation professional you can read about things, you can speak with people, but 
I think you need to add in the perspective of folks who are doing the work. I think 
it makes it much more richer. 
Qualitative Methods 
Since I am using an explanatory mixed methods approach for this research my 
qualitative data collection and analysis sequentially follows my quantitative data 
collection and analysis. I utilize several different qualitative methodological approaches 
in order to address three research questions. 
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1). Are there qualitative differences in the projects funded by community and 
traditional boards that are not revealed in regression analysis?  
 
To address this question I qualitatively examine (through publicly available 
documentation) the description of projects funded (rather than the organizational level 
characteristics I use in regression analysis) by community boards versus those projects 
funded by traditional boards 
Additionally, in this phase of data collection and analysis I utilize existing public 
participation literature to explain my quantitative findings. Public participation scholars 
find that solely focusing on the absence or presence of community involvement is an 
incomplete view of the relationship between community involvement and organizational 
decisions. Researchers find that in order to understand the impact of community input on 
organizational decisions we must take into account the process or design of public 
participation programs (Ebdon and Franklin 2006). Therefore I ask, 
2). Does the absence or presence of components of an effectively designed 
public participation program impact grantee selection? 
 
To address this question I conduct interviews with a community board member, 
community board staff member and a traditional board staff member. I conduct these 
interviews asking respondents whether or not particular design elements are absent or 
present, based on a framework I developed from a comprehensive review of public 
participation literature. This framework contains design elements thought to yield 
differences in organizational decisions when community input is utilized.  
Analyzing Interviews 
I use qualitative content analysis to analyze both the grant descriptions and 
interview data. Qualitative content analysis is defined as an approach of ―systematically 
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identifying key factors and relationships‖ (Miles and Huberman 1994, p. 14). I 
inductively derive broad codes
29
 based on the framework I‘ve developed of an effectively 
designed public participation program that I then used in multiple rounds of open coding 
to determine if particular design elements are absent or present within Foundation 1 and 
Foundation 2.   
Phase III: Data and Methods 
Based on results in phase II I build regression models to take into account the 
design elements of the average grantmakers public participation programs. I rerun 
regression analysis on 5 organizations (removing Foundation 1 which is identified in 
qualitative research as an outlier – having all 8 components of an effectively designed 
process). In this second set of regression models I am left with 194 community board 
grants, 343 traditional board grantees, and 921
30
 non grantees (before restricting my 
analysis to include Tinkelman controls or only those organizations that report meaningful 
levels of revenues and expenses). 
In the next chapter I present my findings for both the hypotheses I test in phase I 
of this research as well as a more complete understanding of how process impacts grantee 
selection derived from qualitative data collected in phase II of this research. I then 
combine the qualitative and quantitative data in phase III, reinterpreting my quantitative 
findings in light of what I found in the qualitative portion of this research. 
  




 For a list of codes for both the grant descriptions and interview data please see Appendix C and D 
30






Phase I: Findings 
Descriptive Statistics 
My purpose in utilizing quantitative analysis in this mixed methods study is to 
first determine if there are differences between community and traditional boards grant 
decisions. First I calculate descriptive statistics and t tests (table 3) on the organizational 
and financial characteristics of community and traditional board grantees. My first 
hypothesis is that community boards will be more likely than traditional boards to 
support grassroots nonprofit‘s. I find support for this hypothesis as a much higher 
percentage of community grantees are grassroots (58% either do not file a 990 or file a 
990 EZ) compared to just 5% of traditional board grantees. Hypothesis 2 is also 
supported as t tests indicate that a larger percentage of traditional board grantees (43% as 
compared to 34%) received funding in a prior year. However, this is weakly significant at 
the .10 level.   
 Community board grantees spend more on fundraising (on average $2.8 million) 
than traditional board grantees (who spend on average $800,000). Community board 
grantees are also more efficient with their fundraising, raising $288 in direct 
contributions for every dollar they spend on fundraising. On the other hand traditional 
board grantees only raise $39 for every dollar they spend on fundraising. At the .10 
significance level, t tests indicate that program efficiency is higher for traditional board 
grantees. Traditional board grantees spend 80% of their total expenses on programs, 
while community board grantees spend 77% of their total expenses. 
 Finally, community board grantees are much more reliant on government grants 
as a percentage of their total expenses than traditional board grantees. Government 
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grants, on average, compromise 33% of community board grantees expenses and only 
compromise 16% of traditional board grantees expenses. All other financial 
characteristics of community and traditional board grantees did not reveal any 
statistically significant differences when t tests were conducted. Complete descriptives 
are available in Appendix D. These results are further explored in regression analysis. 
 
 





   
Age (mean) *** 14.3 21.6 
   
Percentages   
Repeat Grantees* 34 43.03 
   
Professionalism Scale (1-3)***   
      No 990 required 46.35 2.37 
      Short from 990 PC 11.98 2.67 
     Long form 990 PC 41.67 94.96 
   
Sub-Sector   
     Arts*** 15.05 9.23 
     Education 6.99 10.15 
     Environment 11.83 8.31 
     Health* 8.06 4.62 
     Human services 31.72 27.08 
     International 2.69 4.62 
     Public*** 18.82 34.46 
     Religion* 3.76 1.23 
     Mutual 0 0 
     Unknown 1.08 0.31 
   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Regression Analysis 
In tables 4 and 5 I present my regression models.  Hypotheses 3 and 4 are not 
supported.   I originally hypothesized that community boards grantees would be younger 
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than traditional board grantees. However, I find the opposite. Traditional board grantees 
demonstrate no preferences in regards to age while community boards select older 
grantees. I also hypothesized that community boards would select smaller grantees than 
traditional boards. I find instead that size does not impact a community boards‘ grant 
decision.  
In hypothesis 5, I predicted that nonprofit‘s spending less on fundraising would be 
more likely to be selected by community boards. This hypothesis is not supported as the 
result is not significant and the amount a nonprofit spends on fundraising expenses does 
not impact whether or not a nonprofit is selected as a grantee by a community board.  
Since descriptive statistics indicate that community board grantees spend much more on 
fundraising than traditional board grantees and are also more efficient fundraisers than 
traditional board grantees, this finding needs additional exploration. 
Hypothesis 6 is also not supported as the more a nonprofit spends on management 
expenses the more likely they will be chosen as a community board grantee. However, 
this should be interpreted with caution as the result is weakly significant at the .10 level.  
Finally, Hypothesis 7 is partially supported (depending on which financial variable is 
included in the model).  How much a nonprofit spends on programs makes no impact on 
whether or not they are selected as a community or traditional grantee, when controlling 
for the amount a nonprofit spends on management expenses. However, when controlling 
for the amount a nonprofit spends on fundraising expenses, the more an organization 
spends on programs the more likely it will be selected as a community board grantee. 
This result is significant at the .01 level.   
Discussion 
Although I do find that community boards demonstrate preferences in selecting 
nonprofit‘s that are much more similar to the nonprofit‘s awarded grants by traditional 
boards than existing literature would predict, I do find that traditional boards have much 
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stronger preferences as 3 of their 4 coefficients (excluding control variables) are 
significant at the .01 level.  
I find that if a nonprofit is older they are more likely to receive a grant from a 
community board.  I also find that spending a higher proportion of a nonprofit‘s expenses 
on program expenses rather than management expenses, does not impact whether a 
nonprofit is selected as a community board grantee. On the other hand spending a higher 
proportion of expenses on programs rather than fundraising greatly impacts the likelihood 
that a nonprofit receives a grant from a community board.  
Both age and the amount spent on program expenses have opposite findings from 
what research predicts. Contrary to expectations, developed from the information 
asymmetry arguments of the economic model of giving, older nonprofit‘s were more 
likely to receive a grant from a community board. Perhaps for community boards, age is 
an indicator of a nonprofit‘s‘ reputation and/or trustworthiness in the community. For 
community members, older nonprofit‘s may be more embedded in a community than 
younger nonprofit‘s. An alternative explanation is that community boards are more likely 
than traditional boards to select grantees that they are more familiar with similar to what 













Table 4. Logistic regression models (With Fundraising Expenses) 




VARIABLES   
   
Age 0.0140** -0.00324 
 (0.00702) (0.00495) 
 
Size (Assets, log) -0.00540 0.187*** 














 (0.0263) (0.0162) 
 
Arts -0.00355 -1.158*** 
 (0.361) (0.262) 
 
Education -0.698 -0.585** 
 (0.528) (0.272) 
 
Health -1.121** -2.099*** 
 (0.484) (0.354) 
 
Human Services -0.182 -0.631*** 
 (0.299) (0.179) 
 
Constant -5.232*** -5.577*** 
 (0.789) (0.560) 
   
Observations 727 1,017 
   
Standard errors in parentheses 








Table 5. Logistic regression models (With Management Expenses) 




VARIABLES   
   
Age 0.0131* -0.00477 
 (0.00697) (0.00485) 
 
Size (Assets, log) -0.0160 0.186*** 













 (0.101) (0.0676) 
 
Arts -0.0795 -1.204*** 
 (0.359) (0.258) 
 
Education -0.766 -0.652** 
 (0.528) (0.266) 
 
Health -1.236** -2.301*** 
 (0.489) (0.361) 
 
Human Services -0.249 -0.664*** 
 (0.298) (0.177) 
 
Constant -5.614*** -6.502*** 
 (0.737) (0.572) 
   
Observations 727 1,016 
Standard errors in parentheses 




Phase II: Findings 
The quantitative results are surprising as they do not support the hypotheses 
predicted by existing literature. In fact, there is quite a bit of congruence between grant 
decisions made by community boards and those made by traditional boards. After 
analyzing the quantitative results, the question remains what difference does community 
input make? By using qualitative data and analyses in an explanatory mixed methods 
design I determine if there are other explanations that may account for the similarity in 
grant decisions found in Phase I of this research. I address three research questions in 
Phase II of this study. 
1). Is the congruence between community and traditional boards grant decisions 
largely a result of regression analyses in which I can only examine characteristics 
of the organizations who received a grant? Are there qualitative differences in the 
types of projects that were funded by community and traditional boards within 
Foundation 1 or Foundation 2? 
2). Is the congruence between community and traditional boards largely due to the 
absence or presence of components of an effectively designed community 
involvement program within Foundation 1 or Foundation 2? Essentially, do I find 
a similarity in grant decisions between community and traditional boards because 
the process of how traditional and community boards make their grant decisions 
are similar within Foundation 1 or Foundation 2? 
3). Can the framework I‘ve developed regarding the design elements of a public 
participation program that are necessary to change organizational decisions be 
utilized in a nonprofit context?  
Qualitative Differences in Grantee Selection 
One of the difficulties with ascertaining the differences in grantee selection 
between community and traditional boards is that 990 data (although consistent across 
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nonprofit organizations) is at the organizational level when in reality most foundations 
fund projects. For example, a very professional, large nonprofit could receive a grant for 
a very small grassroots project within that nonprofit. Alternatively, many organizations 
that do not have a 501 (c) (3) status are required by funders to have a fiscal sponsor
31
 (a 
larger organization that works with the smaller organization applying for the grant).  
 However, for each of the nonprofit‘s awarded a grant I have a brief description of 
the project funded from publicly available documents. This allows me to discern, at the 
project level, whether there are qualitative differences in the types of nonprofit‘s awarded 
grants by community and traditional boards.  
Foundation 1: Projects Funded by Traditional and Community Boards 
For Foundation 1 the community and traditional board awarded 372 grants to 
nonprofit‘s during 2008. 203 of these grants were awarded by the community board while 
169 were awarded by the traditional board.  
 The project descriptions of organizations funded by the community and traditional 
boards indicate vast differences. One of the most interesting differences is that many of 
the projects funded by community boards fund start up organizations or more short term 
projects within larger, more established organizations. A community board member 
states, ―I really look for the scrappy groups, they had an idea and they wanna see if they 
can get funded because their already doing it‖. On the other hand a staff member working 
with the traditional board member describes the role of the staff and board as one where 
they work collaboratively to invest long term in organizations. 
  
 




 Depending on the organization and project proposed this fiscal sponsor may or may not play a large role 
in the delivery of the project, but always plays a large role in the administration of funding received. 
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I mean the staff works for the board. I think sometimes in foundations people 
don‘t present it that way. The staff does not work for the applicants it works for 
the board. And if the board and staff are not on the same page then somebody 
should say – either the board should hire a staff who works for them or the staff 
and the board should spend more time together and understand strategy and see 
how the grants are put together (Staff member working with the traditional 
board). 
 
On the other hand, staff of the community board does not focus or see their grants as long 
term investments in organizations.  
 
Yea, so they can come back to us. Theres no limit to how many times they can 
come back but our thing is less about sustainability – if it can be sustainable that‘s 
fine but our main thing is really about getting people active and engaged (Staff 
member working with the community board). 
 
Foundation 2: Projects Funded by Traditional and Community Boards 
Foundation 2 awarded 82 grants during 2008. 4
32
 of those grants were awarded by 
the community board and 78 were awarded by the traditional board. Unlike Foundation 1,  
there are not apparent differences between the types of projects funded by the community 
and traditional board. Both groups seem to fund a variety of projects engaged in both 
expansion of activities as well as general operating support to sustain existing activities.  
Staff working with the traditional board describes the types of projects they fund 
similar to the way community boards describe the types of nonprofit‘s they fund. 
There‘s no foundations that want to look at them because their grassroots, because 
they don‘t have a record, because they don‘t have paid staff, ya know all of these 
things that make for strong infrastructure (Staff member working with the 
traditional board). 
 




 Although we only have 4 grants to compare the community and traditional boards on, Foundation 2 does 
have an entire grants process (separate staff, separate application process, separate boards) devoted to this 
process and I consequently compare the decisions made in the community boards grant process to grant 
decisions made in the traditional boards grant process. 
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This is similr to what a member of the community board states. 
I love being able to take more risky grants to be the first foundation that invests 
and shows supports. . .I love working with more smaller sized organizations to 
help them with their capacity building, developing their boards. I like that, I think 
it‘s a challenge. 
 
Summary: Qualitative Differences in Grantee Selection 
 The types of projects funded by community and traditional boards within 
Foundation 1 and Foundation 2 are very different. In Foundation 1 community boards 
largely fund start up organizations or short term projects within more established 
organizations. On the other hand, traditional boards are much more oriented to funding 
long term solutions to community issues and therefore primarily fund more established 
nonprofit organizations and projects. Yet, for Foundation 2 similar projects are funded by 
the community and traditional board.  
Below, I further explore how the process of community involvement or the design 
of a public participation program may also impact grantee selection. 
Design Elements of Public Participation Programs 
 Are the design elements thought to change organizational decisions, when 
community input is utilized, found in the design of community involvement programs 
within Foundation 1 or Foundation 2? Through qualitative interviews with a staff 
member working with the community board, and a community board member I compare 
their descriptions of the grant making process with the framework
33
  I‘ve developed of an 
effectively designed community involvement program. A summary of the absence or 




 Please refer to pages 34-35 which includes a framework of the design elements I identified from existing 
literature as necessary components to a public participation program. I used this framework to guide the 
semi-structured interview protocol about the process of involving community members in grant decisions. 
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presence of each design element within Foundation 1 and Foundation 2 is provided below 



































  Foundation 1 Foundation 2 
Authenticity    
 Opportunities X X 
 Timing X  
    
Participant 
Selection 
   
 Invitation X  





   





 Small group 
interactions 
X X 




Authentic participation by community members is thought to be a critical 
component of designing community involvement programs. For grant making 
organizations an authentic program has two components: 1) community members are not 
just present during the grant making process but are initiating and taking the lead during 
the reviews, site visits and deliberation and 2) community members grant decisions are 
reflective of the final grant awards. 
Foundation 1: Authenticity 
The community board in Foundation 1 satisfies both components of an authentic 
public participation process. First, community boards not only take the lead during the 
grant making process but are solely responsible for reviewing proposals, conducting 
interviews with applicants and consequently making final grant recommendations. Staff 
are primarily used to coordinate the administrative components of the grants process. A 
staff member working with the community board describes the role of the staff as mainly 
administrative. 
So each team has a staff liaison but they‘re not voting members so they never vote 
and say this is what I think you should do. They just keep going back to the 
questions and facilitating conversations. 
 
 Additionally, through a process of iterative discussions grant decisions by 
community boards are reflective of final grant awards. 
Then they come together the week after that and they say ok, based on the 
interviews and the information we have. Who are we gonna fund and for how 
much, so they make an initial recommendation to the committee, each team does 
and we get that as a staff and we add it up. And usually its more than what we 
have to give out. . .And at that point we have each team, they can‘t go through 
every proposal, but we ask them to give us their thinking on a few of them to hear 
kinda what their thoughts are and then give the committee an opportunity to ask 
them about those proposals or some of the others that they ah, reviewed that 
someone may have a question about. So it‘s kind of a tough meeting, because 
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there‘s a lot of back and forth and it can sometimes get a little tense, which is fine 
but I think it‘s a needed thing (Staff member working with the community board). 
 
Foundation 2: Authenticity 
  For Foundation 2 it is clear that community members (even with an equal amount 
of donors on the board) are given the lead during the reviewing process, site visits and 
subsequent deliberations. One of the donors who works with the community board 
mentions, ―When we go to site visits, I try not to ask questions and let the community 
collaborators lead it‖.  
 However, for Foundation 2 community members input does not satisfy the second 
component within an authentic public participation program. Community boards grant 
decisions may not be reflective of final grant awards and instead may reflect staff 
preferences and/or donor decisions. For example, ―The committee collaborators will sort 
of back off and say ultimately it‘s not our money, it‘s the donors money and if they feel 
strongly about these groups then we should. ..‖ (Staff member working with the 
community board).  Additionally staff members preferences may yield final grant awards 
reflective of their input, rather than community members input. 
 
And I‘ve been running this fund now for 6, almost 7 years. And you know that 
there are certain grantees that will succeed and some that won‘t. Who will 
understand developing work plans and assessing their work and actually just 
having the infrastructure to succeed? So when I‘m voting I‘m looking not just for 
a group that‘s exciting and risky, and things that don‘t just seem exciting to the 
committee,. . . but then I look at it like okay, that‘s exciting but is this group going 
to survive when their getting this grant, have they shown enough for me to feel 
like they have it together  (Staff member working with the community board). 
 
Participant Selection 
Two components of a participant selection process that researchers find play a 
significant role in the relationship between community input and organizational decisions 
are 1) the variety of ways the organization recruits community board members and 2) the 
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intention of the organization in selecting community board members that are 
representative of the general public. 
Foundation 1: Participant Selection 
Foundation 1 is satisfying both components of an effective participant selection 
process in a public participation program. Foundation 1 is recruiting participants in a 
number of different ways. They invite participants through a nomination process, use 
existing committee members to recruit potential members and ―we put stuff in some of 
the local neighborhood newspapers, newsletters, that go out and say we‘re looking for 
committee members‖ (Staff member working with the community board). Additionally,   
So we have a team of people we call ambassadors and they go out and talk about 
neighborhood connections. So they recruit people, talk to people about applying, 
talk about joining the committee um do that kind of thing. So they cover the 
whole city (Staff member working with the community board). 
 
 Foundation 1 is also purposeful in selecting community board members that are 
demographically representative of the public ―looking at different levels and different 
skill sets and different neighborhoods and also different socioeconomic class. And also, 
we‘re looking at racial and ethnic‖ (Staff member working with the community board). 
Community board staff members believe diverse perspectives in its grantmaking process 
are important. 
Well people see things in very different lenses so I think it‘s important to have 
understanding, especially when grant applicants come in from really different 
populations. So you see some really different things come in so to have someone 
who can see things a little bit differently or from a different perspective, 
especially based in their culture. Like I may read it as a white male and say this 
doesn‘t make any sense to me but someone else may say you know what that does 
in my experience as a member of that community. So um, so there‘s that piece of 




Foundation 2: Participant Selection 
In Foundation 2 the organization is not focused on ‗aggressive recruitment‘ 
(Thomas 2012) as they are not inviting community members to participate in several 
different ways. Instead the organization is soliciting participation through their existing 
networks. To recruit new board members the staff of the community board ―asks folks for 
recommendations on who do you think would be good to serve on that committee. So we 
check with the donors and then around the country we check with other foundations‖ 
(Staff member working with the community board).  
On the other hand the community board staff is very focused on satisfying the 
second component of an effectively designed participant selection process – that of 
choosing community board members that are demographically representative of the 
public. 
 
Yes, that‘s very important to us. It‘s not that shocking that most of the donors 
would be white and um, male and ya know I‘ve wanted to get more – one female 
donor which hasn‘t happened yet. So on the community collaborators side we 
tend to focus on getting more women or female identified folks, more people of 




There are four factors of a deliberation process thought to mediate the relationship 
between community input and organizational decisions: 1) Training or education on 
community issues that community boards can utilize during the grants process; 2) the 
opportunity for community members to record their individual evaluations during their 
application reviews while also 3) encouraging small group deliberation and 4) the 




Foundation 1: Deliberation Process 
Foundation 1 satisfies all four components of an effectively designed deliberation 
process within a public participation process. First, it provides a number of different 
opportunities and venues for members of the community board to learn about pressing 
community issues. In addition to trainings that the committee receives before beginning 
to review grant applications the staff also does, ―neighborhood tours, or we may bring in 
a speaker or go to some place to learn more about a particular – ya know, just a particular 
issue or building community in those kinds of things‖ (Staff member working with the 
community board). The organization also has small pools of money for community board 
members to be trained and learn about broader issues that are being dealt with in their 
community. For example, 
Then the other is exposing them to other things going on, connecting them to 
other trainings – or we have our own things we do with them. Like they‘ve been 
to some of the Grassroots Grantmakers, um, things in different cities or we‘ve 
taken them to other things around here (Staff member working with the 
community board). 
 
Community board staff also indicates that they value individual input during this process.  
Community board members individually score applications and are provided a set of 
guidelines by the foundation staff. 
 
Yea, we have a list. They have a list and they go through that list so there‘s kind 
of a grading sheet and they use that. Now those numbers aren‘t – you can change 
those as you go through but it gives you a sense of what we‘re looking for. So we 
go through who‘s driving the bus? Who‘s running this project? Are they building 
relationships? Are they tapping into community resources? Can they do this 
project? Is it feasible? Those kinds of questions, there‘s a list of about 10 
questions on there and there‘s a number scale so they use that, and even before 
that they have another little scale they do so that when they first get the proposals, 
before they even interview anyone they come and have a sense of who they really 
like based on what they read. There‘s a three question scale that they do even 
before they come to the first meeting that has the criteria on there (Staff member 




After individually recording their evaluations of nonprofit‘s, community board 
members come together in small groups to conduct interviews and make final grant 
decisions. This deliberative process is highly interactive with community members 
constantly engaged in discussions with other members of the small group. 
After the interview and before the next interview we briefly go through and ask 
questions. Like the Foundation 1 summary format questions. Did we think the 
project was neighborhood specific? Do we think the group did good on their 
proposal? Was their budget thoroughly thought out? There‘s like several 
questions you ask. And we‘ll do that briefly (Community board member). 
 
Finally, Foundation 1 also has nonvoting staff that remain completely neutral 
throughout the grants process. The primary duty of staff during this process is to 
―facilitate the conversations and ask the tough questions and get people talking to each 
other about what they think and make sure we‘re sticking to the real goals of the program 
(Staff member working with the community board). 
Foundation 2: Deliberation Process 
Community boards in Foundation 2 are not provided any training or educating 
before they begin reviewing grants and conducting site visits. For Foundation 2 this is 
seen as one of the major assets of community boards as they do not need any education or 
training and can instead rely on their existing knowledge of community issues. 
 
Ah, we don‘t provide formal training. I think that most of the things community 
members learn they learn by doing through this process. For folks who have 
worked in nonprofit‘s or done organizing or whatever, their familiar with the 
different strategies that are being utilized by these applicants. And working in that 
setting I think they have a better understanding of what it takes to be successful 
(Staff member working with the community board). 
 
 When the staff member who works with the community board read a list of 
requirements for community board members during our interview she listed the ability to 
evaluate grantees as one of the last requirements. Later she stated, ―So as you can see the 
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actual experience of evaluating grantees comes a little later. We‘re more looking for um, 
an expertise of issues and a sort of commitment to learn and do and work well with 
others‖ (Staff member working with the community board).    
 However, the ability to work well with others is a major component of the 
deliberation process as the majority of the deliberation process takes place in small 
groups (teams of 2). Yet, community members do have the opportunity to score 
applicants individually in the beginning of the grants process, satisfying the second 
component of an effectively designed deliberation process.  Foundation 2 is committed to 
ensuring that community board members feel their individual voices are valued 
throughout the deliberation process. 
 
But folks are fine now that we‘re not reaching consensus and we devote a lot of 
time to the decision making process so everyone knows that if they don‘t agree 
with the entire group they‘ve at least had their concerns heard and we‘ll continue 
along with the process so folks feel comfortable enough so if they still haven‘t 
changed the vote at least they feel like they‘ve been heard and I‘m okay going 
with the group wisdom on this one (Staff member working with the community 
board). 
 
Initially individual scores by the community board determine which nonprofit‘s can 
submit a full proposal, site visits, and which groups will receive a grant.  After this initial 
scoring the majority of the grants process does occur in small groups, a third component 
of an effectively designed public participation program. 
 Yet, the staff member involved in this process does not remain neutral. In fact, the 
staff member is a voting member of the board. And although she has one vote she does 
not always yield to majority decisions.   
. . .but then I look at it like okay, that‘s exciting but is this group going to survive 
when their getting this grant, have they shown enough for me to feel like they 
have it together. I don‘t always agree with the majority of the committee, so I‘m 




Summary of Design Elements Across Foundation 1 and Foundation 2 
The community and traditional boards within Foundation 1 fund different types of 
projects, with community boards focusing more on start up or short term solutions to 
community issues and traditional boards focusing more on long term solutions to 
community issues. On the other hand for foundation 2, the types of projects funded by 
community and traditional boards are very similar.  
Additionally, since existing public participation research emphasizes the design of 
public participation programs I investigate how the design of community involvement 
programs within these two foundations may impact grantee selection. 
 When I compare the process or how the programs were designed within each 
foundation, Foundation 1 has all of the elements (identified by public sector scholars) of 
an effectively designed public participation program. Consequently, I find that there are 
drastic differences in the projects selected by community and traditional boards. In this 
sense the community input does what it is intended to do, change the grant decisions that 
would typically be made by a traditional board. 
 On the other hand Foundation 2 has only 4 of the 8 design elements identified by 
public sector scholars as critical components of a public involvement program. 
Consequently I find that there are more similarities between the projects funded by 
community and traditional boards. 
 First, the foundations differ in having an authentic public participation program as 
community input may not reflect final grant awards in Foundation 2. In Foundation 2, a 
mix of donors and a voting member of the staff likely thwart grant decisions to not be 
reflective of community input. Secondly, although both boards are very clear and 
intentional about selecting community board members representative of the populations 
and communities they serve Foundation 1 is much more aggressive in its tactics about 
recruiting new board members.  Foundation 2 tends to rely on its existing networks to 
recruit board members. Again, since Foundation 2‘s community and traditional boards 
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fund more similar projects it may be that the ‗community‘ members on the community 
board are very similar to its traditional board members and consequently making similar 
decisions. In future research I hope to collect more detailed information on the 
characteristics of individuals who serve as board members. 
 Finally, for Foundation 2 it neither provides education for its community board on 
community issues, nor has a neutral staff member involved in its grants process. On the 
other hand Foundation 1 provides multiple opportunities for community boards to learn 
about community issues and its staff members are only utilized for administrative 
processes during the grants process.  
Discussion 
 Apparent from these case studies is that a public sector framework of design 
elements (identified by public participation scholars) is extremely useful in understanding 
the complex relationship between community involvement and grant decisions. This 
framework provides a more clear understanding of the differences or similarities in 
organizational decisions that result within two foundations who have designed their 
community involvement programs very differently. The presence of these design 
elements and the vigor with which Foundation 1 has undertaken some of these design 
elements yields differences in the projects funded by its community and traditional board. 
On the other hand the absence of these design elements in Foundation 2 yields more 
similarities in the projects funded community and traditional boards. This analysis 
indicates that for Foundation 2, involving community members without focusing on the 
process of a community involvement program yields grant decisions that are not 





Phase III: Findings 
 In phase II of this research I examined project level differences in grant decisions  
within two grantmakers public participation programs. The qualitative analysis indicated 
that Foundation 1 was likely an outlier since its public participation program consisted of 
all 8 elements identified in public participation literature as components of an effectively 
designed public participation program. I consequently use these qualitative findings to 
rebuild the regression models I previously ran in phase I of the dissertation.  
 Although I was not able to conduct qualitative analyses on all 6 of the 
organizations I suspect that due to resource constraints and lack of organizational 
learning the average grantmaker is not likely to have all design elements in a public 
participation program. Therefore, I remove Foundation 1 from the regression models and 
examine the organizational and financial differences in grant decisions between 
community and traditional boards in Table 7 and Table 8 below. 
Discussion 
 Similar to the initial findings in phase I, traditional boards do exhibit stronger 
preferences in their grantmaking decisions. In Table 7 where I include fundraising 
expenses (as opposed to management expenses) traditional boards prefer to award grants 
to organizations that are larger, spend more on programs and more on fundraising (a 
proxy for advertising expenses). These results are all statistically significant at the .01 
level. In Table 8 where I include management expenses (as opposed to fundraising 
expenses) traditional boards‘ preferences remain strong and statistically significant at the 
.01 level with preferences for larger organizations that spend more on programs. 
On the other hand findings for community boards are not reflective of phase I 
findings indicating that the design elements or process of community involvement for the 
average grantmaker are creating more similarities between the grantmaking decisions of 
community and traditional boards.  
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 In Table 7 where I include fundraising expenses community boards are more 
likely to award grants to organizations that are older, larger and spent more on 
fundraising. In phase I community boards were more likely to award grants to 
organizations that were older and spent more on programs (a proxy for an organizations 
commitment to its mission). Program expenses are no longer an important drive of grant 
awards for the average grantmakers community involvement program. Instead, size 
becomes an important characteristic when the average grantmakers community board is 
making their grant decisions.  
 Similarly, in Table 8 where I include management expenses, community boards 
are more likely to award grants to organizations that are older and larger. In the 
regression models included in phase I management expenses (which serves as a proxy for 
how professional the organization is) was significant and size was not. For the average 
grantmakers community involvement program (with an average design process) grant 









VARIABLES   
   
Age 0.0131* -0.00339 
 (0.00798) (0.00532) 
 
Size (Assets, log) 0.167* 0.126** 
 (0.0922) (0.0560) 
 
Program Expenses (log) 0.102 0.225*** 





 (0.0321) (0.0189) 
 
Arts -0.611 -0.841*** 
 (0.486) (0.281) 
 
Education -0.779 -0.400 
 (0.603) (0.301) 
 
Health -1.243** -1.604*** 
 (0.548) (0.359) 
 
Human Services -0.349 -0.332* 
 (0.355) (0.197) 
 
Constant -6.386*** -6.045*** 
 (0.907) (0.622) 
   
Observations 700 918 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
81 
 
Table 8: Logistic Regression Models (With Design Elements and Management Expenses) 
 





   




Size (Assets, log) 0.171* 0.155*** 










 (0.121) (0.0716) 
 
Arts -0.698 -0.886*** 
 (0.484) (0.273) 
 
Education -0.894 -0.546* 
 (0.599) (0.291) 
 
Health -1.378** -1.871*** 
 (0.549) (0.363) 
 
Human Services -0.431 -0.378* 
 (0.354) (0.194) 
 
Constant -6.720*** -6.839*** 
 (0.879) (0.622) 
   
Observations 681 899 
Standard errors in parentheses 





As Grantmakers for Effective Organizations found in their 2010 report nearly 
50% of funders are involving stakeholders in their grant decisions. Furthermore, calls for 
stakeholder involvement in philanthropy have been pervasive throughout scholarly and 
practitioner oriented literature for the past 30 years (Arnove 1980; Bombardieri and 
Robinson 2005; Nielson 1972; Odendahl 1989). Yet, it has always been assumed that 
simply involving community members in organizational decisions would be enough and 
somehow lead to ‗better‘ grant decisions. What I find instead is a much more complex 
story of community involvement in philanthropic decisions.  
It is not merely the absence or presence of community members that changes an 
organizations decisions but rather how these community members are engaged that is 
important.  Conducting case studies within two foundations offers insights describing 
both how foundations are utilizing community boards and how the design of these 
programs may impact grantee selection. Furthermore, the regression analysis I conduct 
removing Foundation 1 (which has all 8 components of an effectively designed public 
participation program) indicates that for the average grantmaker community and 
traditional board grant decisions are remarkably similar. 
In Phase I of this research I employ quantitative methods and test the assumption 
that community boards and traditional boards will make different grant decisions. 
Although I do find overall evidence supporting literature based in differences of donation 
decisions based on the information asymmetry arguments (as community members rely 
less on the organizational and financial characteristics of nonprofit‘s than traditional 
boards) many of my hypotheses are not supported. The hypotheses based on 
organizational theory (elite and network theory) are supported  whereas the hypotheses 
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based on the economic model of giving are completely contrary to what we may expect 
from existing literature.   
The findings in this research that are contrary to the economic model of giving 
indicate that researchers studying grantmaking cannot rely on empirical findings based on 
how donors (an aggregated variable representing individual donors, government funders, 
corporate grants, foundation grants, and federated campaign funded) respond to 
organizational and financial characteristics. During a donation decision, there are 
differences between the way a nonprofit‘s organizational and financial characteristics are 
used by donors and how they are used by philanthropic boards. This suggests that 
philanthropic institutions are different from other donors in their approach to giving and 
future research needs to explore how and why these differences exist. Additionally, the 
similarity between community and traditional boards giving decisions may indicate that 
there are some negative implications of involving individuals who have a great deal of 
existing knowledge about nonprofit applicants. Perhaps community boards, similar to 
traditional boards, are not open to funding nonprofits with organizational and financial 
characteristics that do not traditionally drive donation decisions. It could be that 
community boards are also more trustworthy of more established organizations that may 
have more legitimacy or at the very least long histories in the community.Although many 
respondents in the interviews mentioned wanting to fund risky projects and organizations 
the quantitative analysis reveals that this is largely not taking place, even amongst 
community boards. Further research is needed to explore these findings in detail. 
In Phase II I expand upon these initial quantitative findings and qualitatively 
discern:  1) whether or not there are differences in the projects funded by community and 
nonprofit boards and 2) whether the absence or presence of components of an effectively 
designed public participation programs impacts grantee selection. 
By looking at narrative descriptions of projects funded by community and 
traditional boards (rather than the characteristics of organizations which are included in 
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the regression results) I discern some differences between grant decisions made by 
community and traditional boards. However, these differences are most apparent in 
Foundation 1 which not only involves community members but subscribes to the 
practices advocated by public participation scholars regarding the design of community 
involvement programs. For Foundation 2 the differences between the projects funded by 
the community and traditional board are not as drastic as Foundation 1. This indicates 
that the process or how an organization designs its public participation program impacts 
grantee selection.  
Findings from this case study research support existing public participation 
literature. In public participation literature scholars assert that simply involving 
community members in organizational decisions does not yield an automatic difference 
in organizational decisions. Instead, my findings confirm what public participation 
scholars already know, that there are particular conditions and factors necessary in order 
for community input to make a difference in organizational decisions. 
Additionally in phase II of the research I conduct an extensive review of public 
participation literature and develop a unique framework of 8 design elements that are 
necessary in order for public participation programs to change grantmaking decisions. 
Initially this framework identifies groupings of variables based on existing public 
participation research by Ebdon and Franklin (2006) and Thomas (2012). However, 3 of 
the 8 variables are specifically defined to be applicable to grantmakimg organizations 
representing a contribution to public participation and nonprofit literature. 
Finally, in phase III of the dissertation I remove Foundation 1 from the regression 
models since it is likely an outlier, the organization‘s qualitative interviews revealed it 
had 8 of the 8 design elements necessary in an effectively designed public participation 
process). The regression models I build in light of the qualitative findings examines the 
average grantmakers design process and finds that community and traditional board grant 
decisions become very similar. Furthermore, how committed an organization is to 
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achieving its goals (program expenses) becomes insignificant and instead I find that 
community boards rely on traditional drivers of donation decisions. This analysis again 
demonstrates that community involvement without any focus on the design or process of 
public participation will not automatically yield a difference in grant decisions as is 
hypothesized and discussed in grantmaking literature. 
Policy Implications 
In 2007, Eisenberg wrote that ―the governance of American foundations should be 
high on the priority list of researchers. It is a topic that would provide additional insight 
to our grantmaking process‖ (4). Additionally, nearly 50% of funders surveyed by 
Grantmakers for Effective Organizations in 2010 (Enright and Bourns) are engaging 
stakeholders in some way in their grant process. Although many funders are 
experimenting with new forms of philanthropic governance empirical research examining 
the connection between philanthropic governance and grantmaking has not been 
undertaken to date. Furthermore, rhetoric in grantmaking literature often alludes to 
community involvement in grantmaking organizations as having the potential to alter 
grantmaking decisions in ways that can benefit nonprofit organizations and the 
beneficiaries they serve. 
This rhetoric is reflected in a number of normative assumptions around 
philanthropic governance, that because these institutions are largely governed by white, 
wealthy men the resulting grant decisions are not reflective of nonprofit or community 
needs.  In fact, during 2008 the Greenlining Institute proposed legislation (Assembly Bill 
624) in California around this very assumption. Survey research found that 28% of 
California‘s Foundations had no minority representation on their boards. Additionally, 
nearly 50% of the grants in the State that were made to minority led/minority serving 
nonprofit‘s came from 10 foundations. Citizens, politicians and advocacy organizations 
were outraged when these statistics were collected. It seemed that these elite foundation 
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boards were making grant decisions not reflective of nonprofit or community need, and 
awarding grants to certain nonprofit‘s while disadvantaging others.  
As part of proposed regulations in Assembly Bill 624, California‘s foundations 
would have to describe the demographics of their own boards and staff as well as the 
demographics of the nonprofit‘s they selected as grantees. Foundation and nonprofit 
leaders banded together across the nation and fought this legislation which did not pass.  
On the other hand in Florida, Senate Bill 998 was passed (in many ways a reaction to 
California‘s proposed legislation). This legislation is in essence, anti-regulation and 
instead states that Florida‘s foundations will never have to report this type of 
demographic information. On one hand in California policymakers seem to assume that 
board composition has a significant impact on grantmaking decisions and that changing 
who serves on a foundation board will alter grantmaking decisions. On the other hand 
Florida policymakers have assumed that board composition has no impact on 
grantmaking decisions and that regardless of who serves on a foundation board 
grantmaking decisions will not be impacted. 
Unfortunately in our current policy environment politicians and practitioners do 
not have a clear understanding of the relationship between board composition and 
grantmaking. The mythology created around grantmaking is that elite foundation board 
members select elite nonprofit organizations. The idea that when we change who serves 
on a foundation board we will change the nonprofit‘s selected by these boards pervades 
both normative, practitioner and scholarly literature.  
Yet, the findings in my dissertation question this assumption. One it challenges 
this assumption prima facie and instead finds that even when the board structure and 
composition is changed grant decisions and nonprofit‘s selected are mostly similar. 
Second, this research (particularly the qualitative findings) indicate that the relationship 
between board composition and grant decisions is extremely complicated. There are 
likely a number of institutional, environmental and process variables in addition to other 
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aspects of board governance that influence the relationship between board composition 
and grantmaking decisions.  
My research investigates the process of how community members are utilized in 
the grants process and finds that unless particular components of a public participation 
program are effectively designed grant decisions between community and traditional 
boards may not be different.  Ultimately, the collection and analysis of grants data as well 
as explanations generated from the case studies in this research allow philanthropic 





                  APPENDIX A 
INTERVIEW PROTOCOL 
No. Background Questions Probe 
1 What is your role in this process? 
How many staff members are dedicated to this 
process? 
2 
Describe the entire process of community 
involvement? 
From start to finish, or from recruitment of 
community members to final awarding of grant 
monies 
3 
Why did your agency decide to involve the 
public in decision making? What are the goals of having this board? 
  
How can you tell when/if you've accomplished 
these goals? 
  
How many people make up the community board 
4 
What type of representation are you trying 
to achieve with this community board 
Is demographic representation important to your 
org? Why or why not? 
5 
Do you think community boards use 
different criteria when evaluating 
nonprofit‘s than other boards?  If yes, Why? 
  
What are the criteria that community boards use 
versus traditional boards? 
  
Do you think community boards may use their 
existing knowledge about nonprofit’s in making 
decisions? 
  
What type of existing knowledge do you think 
their using 
6 
What information do you want community 
members to use when making their 
decisions? 
 








 Authenticity Questions 
1 
To what extent does the community board 
take the lead during the grant making 
process Why is it important that this is community led? 
  
Do you have any staff involvement in the 
application reviews or during site visits? 
2 
Are grant decisions made by community 
boards reflective of final grant awards? 
If yes, why don't you have another board 
'approve' these decisions? 
  
If no, why do you allow community members this 
discretion? 
  
Why is this important to your organization? 
   
 
Participant Selection Questions 
 
1 
How many different ways does the 
organization recruit participants for the 
community board? 
Could you tell me all of the different ways your 
agency invites participation? 
  
Why is this important to you? 
2 
To what extent does your organization 
select participants that will be 
demographically representative of the 
public 
Which particular group or community is your 
organization focused on representing? 
  
 Why is that particular group or community 
important to you?? 
  
Could you tell me how your agency selects 
participants that are representative of the 
general public? 
  
Why is this important to you? 
   
 
Deliberation Process Questions 
 
1 
Does your organization educate members 
of the community board about community 
issues the organization is trying to address 
What type of information do you provide to 
community boards? 
  
Why do you provide this type of information? 
  





Does your organization have opportunities 
during the grantmaking process for 
members of the community board to record 




Why is this important to you? 
3 
Are community boards mainly in small 
groups during the grantmaking process? 
 How many members make up your small 
groups? 
  
Why did you decide on this number? 
  
Is there a time during the grantmaking process 




Does a staff member attempts to remains 
neutral and does not influence group 
decisions during the grantmaking process? 
How many staff people do you have dedicated to 
this program? 
  





DESCRIPTION OF FOUNDATION CLASSIFICATIONS 
The IRS classifies private foundations into three types:  private operating 
foundations, exempt operating foundations and private grant making foundations. My 
research focuses on the latter (foundations which primarily exist for the purpose of grant 
making) of which there are three common classifications used by scholars and 
practitioners: community foundations, corporate foundations and independent 
foundations. Recent statistics indicate that independent foundations compose the largest 
percentage of philanthropic organizations with over 67,000 organizations (or 89% of 
foundations). Corporate foundations constitute over 2,700 organizations (or 
approximately 3% of foundations), while community foundations constitute over 709 
organizations (or .9% of foundations).  
There is also another group of grantmaking organizations called funding 
intermediaries, with the most typical example being United Way. Similar to a community 
foundation, donors can either give restricted or unrestricted gift to this organization. 
When donors give unrestricted gifts that money is pooled with other donors who gave 
unrestricted gifts and the board of the funding intermediary makes the decision as to 




CODING SCHEME FOR GRANT DESCRIPTIONS 
I. General Operating Support  
  
II. Program/Project Support  
 A. Seed Money 
 B. Technical Support 
 C. Facilities and 
Equipment Grants 












Participant Selection  
 Invitation 
 Commitment to Diversity 
Deliberation Process  
 Education 
 Recording individual preferences 
 Small group interactions 





FINANCIAL DESCRIPTIVES OF GRANTEES 
 Variables Obs. Mean Std. Deviation Min Max 
Funder Type 
















       
Community Grantees Direct Contributions 80 $13,100,000  $55,200,000  $0  $468,000,000  
Trad. Grantees Direct Contributions 320 $10,500,000  $46,800,000  $0  $644,000,000  
       
Community Grantees Program Revenue 104 $17,000,000  $138,000,000  $0  $1,400,000,000  
Trad. Grantees Program Revenue 329 $23,000,000  $212,000,000  $0  $2,760,000,000  
       
Community Grantees Government Funding 80 $5,647,787  $31,400,000  $0  $213,000,000  
Trad. Grantees Government Funding 319 $3,126,017  $17,000,000  $0  $222,000,000  
       
Community Grantees Contributions 104 $18,100,000  $72,900,000  $0  $481,000,000  
Trad. Grantees Contributions 329 $13,800,000  $56,800,000  $0  $645,000,000  
       
Community Grantees Program Expense 80 $40,000,000  $182,000,000  $0  $1,490,000,000  
Trad. Grantees Program Expense 320 $31,900,000  $209,000,000  $0  $2,470,000,000  
       
Community Grantees Fundraising Expense** 80 $2,814,877  $13,800,000  $0  $113,000,000  
Trad. Grantees Fundraising Expense** 320 $806,389  $2,722,923  $0  $24,700,000  
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Community Grantees Management/Admin. Expenses 80 $4,556,243  $20,800,000  $0  $172,000,000  
Trad. Grantees Management/Admin. Expenses 319 $4,503,402  $40,400,000  $0  $676,000,000  















Trad. Grantees Total Expense 329 $37,100,000  $241,000,000  $8,074  $2,860,000,000  
       
Community Grantees Program Efficiency (Program Exps/Total Exps)* 80 0.7714966 0.2195662 0 1 
Trad. Grantees Program Efficiency (Program Exps/Total Exps)* 320 0.8031673 0.1312888 0 1 
       
Community Grantees Adm. Cost Ratio (Admin Exps/Total Exps) 80 0.1442226 0.1597202 0 0.97 
Trad. Grantees  319 0.1287909 0.0933942 0 0.91 
       
Community Grantees Fundraising Efficiency (Direct Cont/Fund. Exps)** 52 $288  $1,866  $0  $13,468  
Trad. Grantees Fundraising Efficiency (Direct Cont/Fund. Exps)** 268 $39  $385  $0  $6,300  
       
       
Community Grantees Contributions Reliance (Direct Cont/Total Exps) 80 0.5746617 0.905009 0 7.6 
Trad. Grantees Contributions Reliance (Direct Cont/Total Exps) 320 0.6747096 0.7961751 0 11.14 
       
Community Grantees Program Revenue Reliance (Prog. Revenue/Total Exps) 102 0.2522784 0.973185 0 9.67 
Trad. Grantees Program Revenue Reliance (Prog. Revenue/Total Exps) 329 0.1671712 0.2729012 0 1.19 
       
Community Grantees Government Grant Reliance (Gov. Grants/Total Exps)** 80 0.3344307 1.206524 0 8.94 
Trad. Grantees Government Grant Reliance (Gov. Grants/Total Exps)** 319 0.1645676 0.3582685 0 4.55 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 





MULTINOMIAL REGRESSION WITH GRANTEES WHO 
RECEIVED GRANTS FROM BOTH BOARD TYPES (W/O 
TINKLEMAN CONTROLS) 








VARIABLES     
     
Size (log of Assets)  0.0254 0.208*** 0.121* 
  (0.143) (0.0463) (0.0665) 
 
Age  0.000904 -0.00381 0.0136* 
  (0.0138) (0.00486) (0.00707) 
 
Fundraising Expenses (log)  0.0701 0.0982*** 0.0493** 
  (0.0509) (0.0158) (0.0249) 
 
Program Expenses (log)  0.311* 0.0947** 0.0346 
  (0.178) (0.0471) (0.0620) 
 
Arts  -14.40 -1.061*** -0.0512 
  (597.0) (0.254) (0.347) 
 
Education  -0.0281 -0.607** -0.989* 
  (0.610) (0.263) (0.556) 
 
Health  -15.11 -2.003*** -0.937** 
  (717.8) (0.345) (0.474) 
 
Human Services  -0.931 -0.486*** -0.103 
  (0.585) (0.174) (0.287) 
 
Constant  -7.976*** -4.962*** -4.598*** 
  (1.547) (0.497) (0.756) 
     
Observations  1,183 1,183 1,183 
Standard errors in parentheses 




CORRELATION MATRIX OF VARIABLES IN  
REGRESSION MODELS 
       human    -0.0322  -0.0146  -0.0334  -0.0528  -0.0260  -0.0352  -0.2425  -0.2020  -0.1971   1.0000
      health    -0.1399   0.0458   0.0340   0.0464   0.0495  -0.0464  -0.1264  -0.1053   1.0000
   education    -0.0042   0.0454   0.0463   0.0027   0.0016  -0.0133  -0.1296   1.0000
        arts    -0.1204  -0.0542  -0.0936  -0.1083  -0.0672  -0.0775   1.0000
log_fundra~g     0.3783   0.1834   0.4808   0.4744   0.4839   1.0000
    log_mgmt     0.3123   0.2969   0.6157   0.6056   1.0000
    log_prog     0.3322   0.3285   0.6330   1.0000
  log_assets     0.3570   0.4109   1.0000
        age1     0.1336   1.0000
 funder_type     1.0000
                                                                                                        
               funder~e     age1 log_as~s log_prog log_mgmt log_fu~g     arts educat~n   health    human
(obs=1181)










VARIABLES   
   
Age 0.0132* 0.000997 
 (0.00711) (0.00510) 
 
Size (Assets, log) 0.104* 0.209*** 
 (0.0630) (0.0505) 
 
Program Expenses (log) -0.00786 0.115** 
 (0.0550) (0.0549) 
 
Fundraising Expenses (log) 0.0523** 0.100*** 
 (0.0260) (0.0173) 
 
Arts 0.114 -0.841*** 
 (0.354) (0.264) 
 
Education -0.786 -0.524* 
 (0.563) (0.288) 
 
Health -0.821* -1.722*** 
 (0.480) (0.354) 
 
Human Services 0.0460 -0.395** 
 (0.297) (0.189) 
 
Constant -3.958*** -5.633*** 
 (0.718) (0.557) 
   
Observations 792 1014 
Standard errors in parentheses 
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